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SUMMARY
In this thesis we analyze optimal demand management policies for stochastic sys-
tems. In the first system considered, a manufacturer decides how to manage demand from
customers that differ in their priority level and willingness to pay. He has limited pro-
duction capacity and predetermined prices throughout the horizon. We find an optimal
production and inventory strategy that rations current and future limited capacity between
customer classes through reserving inventory for the future and accepting orders now for
future delivery. Next, we extend these results to the case when the customers have differ-
ent tolerance to delayed fulfillment, namely, first-class customers never accept backlogging
whereas second-class customers agree to wait one period for a discount. We find an optimal
policy similar to the production and inventory strategy that is used for the first system
based on threshold values. The third system considers a firm whose recent performance in
meeting quoted leadtimes affects future demand arrivals. We assume that the probability
of a customer placing an order depends on the quoted leadtime, and both customer arrivals
and processing times are stochastic. When capacity of the firm is infinite, we find the
optimal leadtime to quote, and when capacity is finite and leadtime is industry-dictated,
we determine that the optimal demand acceptance policy does not necessarily have a nice
structure. We comment on the structure of the optimal policy for a special case and de-
velop several heuristics for the general case. The final system considered in this thesis is
the Sports and Entertainment industry, where demand is managed for a season of several
performances by selling season tickets initially and single events later in the selling horizon.
We specifically study the optimal time to switch between these market segments dynami-
cally as a function of the state of the system and show that the optimal switching time is a




Matching supply and demand effectively is one of the key factors for a profitable business.
The ill-management of supply can cause excess production, inventory and labor costs or
loss of potential revenue, whereas incompetent demand management policies may result in
the loss of customers and their loyalty. Research on demand management has been pursued
extensively by scholars (economists and operations researchers) due to its importance and
potential for improvement in system. However, rapid advances in technology and science
bring shifts in the business environment in which companies are operating, and these shifts
require new models and techniques to be utilized, therefore continued efforts are required to
improve study in this area. Pricing, rationing and product/service differentiation policies are
several tools to manage demand effectively. In this thesis, we focus on demand management
under stochastic operating environments using tools other than pricing.
Demand management is usually considered as a separate activity from production op-
erations, and in practice most companies have a marketing department deciding pricing,
promotion and advertisement policies to manipulate demand without consulting the produc-
tion department or considering capacity limitations. Intuitively, performance improvements
using demand management that considers production operations or capacity limitations are
expected to be higher, and empirical evidence confirms this expectation (see Hausman et
al. [42]). By this motivation, this dissertation aims at optimizing demand management
in manufacturing and service systems under stochastic operating environments considering
production and capacity limitations. The goal is to use demand management to increase
flexibility to the firm, which can increase profits and improve customer service.
The first part of this dissertation (Chapter 2) addresses demand management of cus-
tomers who differ in their priority level and willingness to pay, by a firm with limited
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production capacity. Today, many firms are exploring production and supply chain strate-
gies where customers may be segmented into different classes based on service level or
priority, which can result in a more efficient production system as well as a better match
between supply and demand. Specifically, when customers are segmented into classes by
service levels based on delivery time, customers with an immediate need (e.g., businesses)
receive expedited product, while flexible customers receive incentives for their patience.
The firm benefits from the flexibility in production gained by backlogging or from longer
leadtime requirements, enabling it to meet more demand or use less overtime to satisfy the
same number of customers. An example of a company using differentiation is Amazon.com,
where consumers can choose expedited shipping or free shipping. In the latter Amazon.com
receives increased flexibility, since the stated leadtime exceeds the actual processing and
transportation time.
Specifically, in Chapter 2 we focus on production and inventory decisions of a firm using
stochastic inventory control, operating in an environment where customer classes are differ-
entiated by their priority level. We introduce “tactical inventory decisions” to improve the
profit, service, and flexibility of the system. The tactical decisions include the use of inven-
tory or capacity allocations in one time period to serve customer demand in another time
period. Specifically, we allow the firm to reserve inventory to satisfy future demand and to
plan backlogging to serve current demand. We analyze the structure of optimal production
and inventory strategies that result when customer classes differ in priority. We find that a
set of threshold policies for the production, reserving and backlogging decisions is optimal
even with multiple classes, and the policy is nested by class. We perform computational
analysis to see that the profit attained when strategic inventory is used can be a significant
improvement over a traditional inventory policy.
In Chapter 2, customer classes are assumed to be differentiated by their priority level,
where higher-class customers receive complete priority over the lower-class customers in
the use of current resources and future backlogging. A key feature of this work is that
customers in both of the classes behave homogeneously in terms of the delivery time, i.e.,
all customers are willing to wait for fulfillment. But in practice, the segmented customer
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classes may behave differently with respect to their acceptance of delay fulfillment, i.e., one
class may never accept delay fulfillment. Therefore in Chapter 3, we develop models that
incorporate tactical inventory decisions for customer classes with non-homogeneous behavior
in terms of delay fulfillment. Specifically, we assume that the first-class customers claim
the item immediately and never accept to be backlogged, whereas second-class customers
accept delay fulfilment for a discount. Although the proof techniques are similar to the ones
in Chapter 2, the results do not follow directly since the difference in customers’ tolerance to
delay fulfillment changes the structure of the models. We show that the optimal production
and inventory strategies for patient and impatient customers are threshold policies for the
production, reserving and backlogging decisions, as the ones that are proven to be optimal
in Chapter 2 for priority-differentiated customers.
In the third part of this dissertation (Chapter 4), we consider the optimal demand man-
agement of a firm when customers choose the firm according to a firm’s past performance.
Mostly thanks to the Internet, in the current business environment customers can easily
share their experiences with each other, informing customers’ decisions about whether or
not to do business with a firm or buy that firm’s products. The delivery time and price
of an item are not the only factors that affect the customer’s decision, but customers may
also consider the past performance of a producer, specifically whether he is meeting the
promised delivery times or not. For example, 78% of companies that operate in a just-in-
time environment in the U.S. ranked delivery reliability as high priority, whereas only 25%
ranked price as high priority (Billesbach et al. [9]).
Specifically, we consider the optimal demand management of a firm via leadtime quota-
tion and order acceptance when the firm’s recent performance of meeting quoted leadtimes
impacts future orders from customers. For this research, allowing leadtime performance to
impact future customer arrivals is an idea that we introduce into the model, since this may
be true in practice. We consider the problem for both infinite and finite capacity cases.
For the infinite capacity case, we find the optimal closed-form expression for leadtime quo-
tation. We show that the optimal leadtime to quote that accounts for past performance
is more conservative (i.e., longer) than the optimal leadtime that ignores it. We also find
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that the optimal leadtime is always positive, unlike in the case that ignores service, which
means that a firm considering the past performance effect would never quote an unethical
leadtime of zero. When capacity is finite and leadtime is industry-dictated, we determine
that the optimal demand acceptance policy does not necessarily have a nice structure, but
in some special cases it is convex in the service level of the firm. For the finite capacity case,
we also develop several heuristics for the order acceptance model with general stochastic
production.
In the final part of the dissertation, Chapter 5, we are analyzing demand management
for the sports and entertainment industry via the selling of season tickets vs. single tickets.
Common industry practice in the sports events is pure bundling, selling only season tickets
first and switching to single ticket sales later in the selling horizon. We will address the
issue of dynamically deciding when to switch from season tickets to singles by considering
the optimal stopping time, which will enable us to take the actual sales realization into
consideration.
Initially, we consider a two-performance selling season and the processes for the bundled
and single-tickets to be Poisson processes with constant rates. These assumptions are later
relaxed in the chapter. We show that the optimal time to switch is determined by a
set of threshold pairs, which are defined by the remaining inventory and the time left in
the horizon. After each sale, the current time is compared to the time threshold for the
corresponding remaining inventory to determine if the switch should be made immediately or
not. We also perform numerical experiments to illustrate the value of dynamically deciding
the switching time instead of deciding it without observing any sales realization, and we
report significant percentage improvements in revenue.
For each of the four topics in the thesis, we present a review of the literature in the
corresponding chapter, describe how our work contributes to the literature, and present the
main models and results. Major proofs are provided in the Appendix. We conclude the
thesis by identifying several areas of future research.
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CHAPTER II
OPTIMAL PRODUCTION AND INVENTORY POLICIES OF
PRIORITY AND PRICE-DIFFERENTIATED CUSTOMERS
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation and Background
Flexibility is essential for businesses in order to deal with variability, uncertainty, and
changes in the business environment. Manufacturing flexibility can be achieved in many
ways including labor force, machinery, product mix, product design, or new products. In-
creasingly, companies are also turning to customer segmentation and tactical inventory
decisions as a source of flexibility.
Differentiated service levels based on delivery time allow customers with an immediate
need (e.g., businesses) to receive expedited product, while flexible customers receive incen-
tives for their patience. An example of a company using differentiation is Amazon.com,
where consumers can choose expedited shipping or free shipping. In the latter Amazon.com
receives increased flexibility, since the stated leadtime exceeds the actual processing and
transportation time. Customer segmentation by time, whether in manufacturing or the
airline industry, provides a mechanism for balancing the supply and demand requirements
of the system (e.g., shifting leisure travel from Friday to Saturday), which allows more ef-
ficient use of existing resources. A key example of a manufacturing company that employs
flexibility in managing customer demand is Dell Inc. Customers are segmented according
to type (e.g., business versus personal), and prices of products change regularly [1].
The primary goal of this research is to provide tools for managing production and
inventory tactically when customers differ in their willingness to pay and their willingness
to wait. The key questions we address are how much to produce and how to allocate
scarce resources (either current inventory or future limited production capacity) dynamically
among different customer classes. We incorporate a firm’s tactical inventory decisions, which
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we define to mean inventory or capacity allocations in one time period to serve customer
demand in another time period. Specifically, we allow the firm to reserve inventory to satisfy
future demand (sometimes called “discretionary sales”), and to plan backlogging, where the
firm can accept orders in a period to be delivered in the future.
For example, many manufacturing companies face the following problem: some cus-
tomers are willing to pay high prices to receive faster fulfillment; other customers are willing
to accept a lower priority for fulfillment, but they demand low prices. The manufacturer
has limited production capacity, and in order to maximize the profit, he needs to allocate
the capacity effectively. With an advanced strategy, the manufacturer can separate the
customers into multiple classes according to priority levels and then manage the production
and the inventory appropriately; we refer to this as a differentiated strategy.
In this chapter we study the Priority Differentiation Strategy (PDS), where we assume
the first class pays a premium to have higher priority in the current period over production
and inventory resources compared to the second class. We assume that the manufacturer
can or is willing to prioritize demand classes. That is, the manufacturer makes a decision
on higher priority demand before he accepts or rejects the lower priority demand requests.
This situation might occur in practice when requests are submitted electronically and are
handled in batches, or it could result from any working environment where a manufacturer
may temporarily ignore requests from second-class customers. Studying the general model
also allows us to analyze several situations that are special cases or extensions of it. For
example, in some circumstances the manufacturer is not able or not allowed to differentiate
the customers and will deal with them as a single class.
We assume demand in each period is a general function of price, is continuous and
differentiable, and is lost if rejected; we do not make restrictive assumptions regarding the
stochastic demand arrivals and the production process. We focus on a periodic review
environment where prices are predetermined but not known by customers until the current
period. We assume backordered demand is fulfilled in the next period.
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2.1.2 Literature Review
One stream of literature related to our work is inventory theory, especially when there are
multiple classes of customers. Two seminal papers in this area are Veinott [83] and Topkis
[80]. In [83], Veinott shows some conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal for
the production decision when cost minimization is the goal. When parameters are time
varying and the classes have different priorities, the demand from a higher class should be
satisfied before demand from a lower class, and further restrictions are necessary on the
costs. A related topic is considered in [80], where the work is extended to decide a set of
critical levels that determine when to satisfy a particular class of demand. Topkis outlines
some assumptions under which the optimal policy has a set of critical numbers (e.g., one
assumption is that penalty costs must be cheaper now than in the future). In both [80]
and [83], the classes of demand are essentially the same except for priority. In our case,
there may be inherent differences between the classes of demand (e.g., willingness to wait or
pay), and we may intentionally backlog customers or reserve inventory for future customers,
which further distinguishes how the different classes may be served. In addition, we assume
production capacity is limited, we do not make any assumptions on costs over time, and we
allow revenue to depend upon customer class.
More recent research in inventory that is relevant includes Sobel and Zhang [73]. In this
work, the authors study an inventory problem with fixed plus linear production costs and
two demand classes. The deterministic demand class must be satisfied immediately, and
the stochastic demand can be backlogged if there is not enough inventory. The main result
is that a modified (s, S) policy is optimal. In our case, our production costs are simpler
(linear only), but demand for both classes is stochastic and we allow tactical inventory.
Frank et al. [32] add to the work, again considering one deterministic and one stochastic
demand class. They allow the firm to specify how much of the stochastic demand to satisfy;
this is somewhat similar to using discretionary sales. Their main result is that a state-
dependent optimal policy exists but is quite complex, so they propose a heuristic policy of
the form (s, k, S), where the rationing policy k specifies the amount of on-hand inventory
to reserve for deterministic demand before ordering; thus, k also determines the inventory
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available to satisfy stochastic demand. Katircioglu and Atkins [47] also consider produc-
tion and allocation problems with multiple classes of customers. In this work, customer
classes require different service levels, and they propose a heuristic that solves the problem
myopically and is easy to implement. For our problem, the optimal policy has a simple
structure and includes explicit decisions for reserving and backordering (other differences
are as outlined above).
One stream of research that considers multiple classes of customers with stochastic
demand in manufacturing focuses on rationing (see for instance, Dekker et al. [17] or Moon
and Kang [61] as well as Topkis [80] reviewed above). The term “rationing” is generally
used to refer to the allocation of a resource such as capacity or inventory between competing
customer classes. The results in this research area often describe threshold or critical levels
that indicate the resource to be allocated to each class. This critical-level policy is optimal
for some cases and is used as a heuristic in others. These papers generally focus on dynamic
control of a single machine, and they do not consider production problems that span a
number of periods with non-stationary parameters. In our case we find threshold values
of this type (see the nesting policy for PDS), and we also incorporate resource allocations
across time periods.
In most of the described results in the rationing area, a key assumption is that demand
is Poisson (see for example, Balakrishnan et al. [5] and Melchiors et al. [57]). In some, there
is also an assumption that the production time is exponential (Ha [39]). The most relevant
work in this stream is Ha [40], who assumes demand is Poisson and the processing time is
Erlang. The key contribution is that the optimal policy has critical levels with monotonic
properties. This policy is most similar to the one we find for PDS in this chapter, although
in our case we have limited production capacity and tactical inventory. We also consider
leadtime differences explicitly and allow planned backlogs.
An important paper that allows tactical inventory is Scarf [68], who introduced discre-
tionary sales into a problem with fixed production setup costs and one customer class. In
his case, a base-stock type of policy is optimal for production, but unlike the production
decision, the optimal discretionary sales decision should be decided after demand is revealed
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in a given period in order to achieve the maximum profit. The use of discretionary sales is
also analyzed in Chan et al. [12], which considers a single-class stochastic inventory model
with multi-period pricing and production decisions under limited capacity when demand is
a general stochastic function.
We build on our work in [12], where we found that a modified base-stock policy with
a production and reserving decision pair was optimal, in which the optimal values do not
depend on the demand that arrives if price is decided in advance. A fundamental difference
in the current research is that we add multiple classes of customers who differ in their
willingness to wait (and pay), and we allow delayed fulfillment. The current work also
builds on Liu and Simchi-Levi [55], who extended [12] to allow delayed fulfillment until the
end of the horizon.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce and analyze
the Priority Differentiation and Non-Differentiation strategies. We perform computational
analysis to compare expected profits under the two strategies in Section 2.3 to explore
the effectiveness of market segmentation in manufacturing. Conclusions are contained in
Section 2.4.
2.2 Models and Results
We focus on a single product sold at a single manufacturer over a multi-period time horizon,
where the manufacturer has limited production capacity in each period. The manufacturer
serves two customer classes, whose demand is ordered by class (i.e., sorted by priority).
This means that in any period, first-class demand is fully known by the manufacturer
before he has to make a decision regarding second-class demand. The customers of these
two classes differ in their priority level and willingness to pay. The first-class customers
are willing to pay a premium over the price of the second-class customers in order to have
priority access in the current period to both on-hand inventory and backlogging availability.
Thus, by paying the premium, first-class customers are satisfied first with the inventory and
backlogging resources available by the manufacturer in the current period, and the demand
of the second-class customers is addressed with the remaining resources.
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The main model that we will consider throughout this chapter is the Priority Differentia-
tion Strategy (PDS), where we assume that the manufacturer has the ability to differentiate
the customer classes. We seek to optimize the allocation of limited inventory and produc-
tion capacity, considering the possibility of reserving inventory to satisfy future demand
and allocating future production capacity by backlogging current demand. We show that
there is an optimal set of production, backlog, and reserve inventory decisions that allo-
cates current and future resources between customer classes. Considering the general model
(PDS) also allows us to analyze other models; for instance, we consider one in which the
manufacturer cannot differentiate the customer classes and treats every customer equally
(see the Non-Differentiation Strategy (NDS)). This extension and others are described in
Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Notation and Assumptions
The manufacturer makes decisions over a multi-period time horizon, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , with
T representing the end of the horizon. The production in each period t is limited by the
capacity, qt, and the manufacturer pays a production cost per unit of ct. Inventory holding
cost is linear, and a charge per unit, ht, is assessed to carry inventory from t to t + 1.
Throughout the chapter, the superscripts of 1 and 2 will be used for the first and second
classes, respectively.
The manufacturer has predetermined prices, p1t and p
2
t , for the customers of the first
and second classes, respectively, that may be different in each period. Separation of pricing
and production decisions is very common in current practice. In some companies, pricing
decisions are made by the marketing department before the start of a selling season, while
production decisions are made by the operations department.
We assume that each first-class customer is charged a higher price than a second-class
customer in the same period; that is, p1t > p
2
t for each t, although we make no restrictions
on prices between different time periods. This even allows p1t < p
2
t+1, in case there is a
significant change in demand curves over time. The salvage value of any units left at the
end of the horizon is υ, and p1T > p
2
T > υ. For classes i = 1, 2, the cost per unit for demand
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in class i that is rejected and lost is `it, and β
i
t is the cost per unit for demand in class i that






t for each t, since losing or delaying the
fulfillment of the first-class customers is more costly than for the second-class customers.
We define net revenue of selling to customer class i from current inventory as pit + ht + `
i
t;
similarly, the net revenue from backlogging is pit − βit + `it. Holding cost, ht, is assumed to
satisfy p1t − β1t + `1t > p2t + ht + `2t in each period t, which ensures that backlogging one
first-class customer is more expensive than rejecting a second-class customer to save a unit
of inventory for the future.
Each customer belongs to only one demand class, and demand from one class is assumed
to be independent of the other class. Each demand function is a general non-stationary
stochastic function, Dit, with known probability and cumulative distribution functions φ
i
t
and Φit, respectively. We assume that the demand function in each period is continuous and
differentiable, but no other assumptions are made on the shape of the demand function, so
a wide variety of demand models could be used.
Production is a decision made at the beginning of each period and the production
leadtime is zero. The net inventory (on-hand − backlogs) at the beginning of period t
is It, and let St represent the net inventory plus production in period t. In our initial
analysis we restrict ourselves to delivering backordered items one period later, and we
assume previously-accepted orders are fulfilled before new orders are accepted, which is
possible since we restrict backorders in each period to be no more than the capacity in the
next period.
The sequence of events in every period is as follows. At the beginning of a period, the
manufacturer checks the inventory level It and decides the production quantity; products
arrive immediately, and the manufacturer fulfills the backorders carried from the previous
period with the available inventory. Then the demand in the current period is revealed and
the manufacturer decides the amount to reserve, Rit, and the amount of future capacity to
make available to current customers (i.e., the amount to backlog), Bit. R
1
t is the amount of
inventory to protect from (not sell to) classes 1 and 2, and R2t is the additional amount of





qt production capacity in period t
ct production cost per unit in period t
ht inventory holding cost per unit from period t to t + 1
p1t price charged to first-class customers in period t
p2t price charged to second-class customers in period t
υ salvage value of any item left at the end of horizon
`it cost per unit for demand in class i that is not satisfied
βit cost per unit for demand in class i that is backlogged
Dit demand realization of class i in period t
It net inventory at the beginning of period t
St net inventory plus production in period t
R1t amount of inventory to protect from classes 1 and 2
R2t amount of additional inventory to protect from class 2
B2t amount of future capacity made available to classes 1 and 2
B1t amount of additional future capacity made available to class 1
The amount of future capacity to make available to classes 1 and 2 now is B2t , and B
1
t is the
additional capacity for class 1; thus, the total capacity for backlogging class 1 is B1t + B
2
t .
The demand is satisfied according to the St, Bit and R
i
t values. The notation that we defined
in this section is provided in Table 1 for ease of reference.
2.2.2 Priority Differentiation Strategy (PDS)
In the Priority Differentiation Strategy, we assume that the first class is willing to pay
a premium to receive priority over all available inventory and backlogging in the current
period. The result is that the first and second classes may be fulfilled now or in the next
period, depending on the status of the system. Thus, the manufacturer has increased
flexibility to match supply and demand.
For the purpose of clarity, we introduce some additional notation in Table 4. Due to our
assumption of the ordering of demand classes, we satisfy the first-class demand before the
second-class demand. Consequently the available inventory for the second class is limited
by the first-class demand that is realized. We define the amount of inventory available
after the first-class demand is satisfied as S2t . Since the first class has higher priority in
the current period, we use as much of B2t as necessary to backlog the first-class demand.
Then we use the remaining part of B2t (if there is any left) to backlog the second-class
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Table 2: Additional notation
S2t = (St −R1t −D1t )+ available inventory after first-class
B2,eft = [B2t − [D1t − [St −R1t ]+]+]+ effective backlog amount after first-class
A1t = min(B1t + B2t , [D1t − [St −R1t ]+]+) actual backlogged orders from first class
A2t = min(B
2,ef
t , [D2t − S2t + R2t ]+) actual backlogged orders from second class
IR
1
t+1 = min(St, R
1







t ) inventory carried forward due to R
2 decision
I lowt+1 = [S
2
t −R2t −D2t ]+ inventory carried forward due to low demand
demand. We call this remaining backlog availability B2,eft , or the effective backlog amount
after first-class demand. For ease of presentation in the chapter, we further define the
actual backlogged orders from first and second-class customers after demand is satisfied
as A1t and A
2
t , respectively, and inventory carried forward due to R





t+1, respectively. If demand is low enough so that there is leftover inventory at the end
of the period, we denote this additional inventory as I lowt+1 (see Table 2 for summary of the
additional notation).
We model the PDS problem as a Markov decision process, where the state of the system
is represented by the net inventory. For clarity of exposition, we present the model with the
Rit and B
i





t decisions are the same whether they are made before or after demand revelation.
Let Jt(It) be the expected profit from period t forward to the end of the horizon, or the
profit-to-go. Let Gt(St) be the expected profit-to-go with St units of product available after
production. The first and second derivatives of Jt(It) are denoted, respectively, as: J ′t(It)
and J ′′t (It); the derivatives of other functions are indicated similarly. We can now write



















t −R2t ]+ + B2,eft
)
−ht[S2t −R2t −D2t ]+ − ht min(R2t , S2t )− htR1t
−`1t
(




D2t − [S2t −R2t ]+ −B2,eft
)+
−β1t min([D1t − St + R1t ]+, B1t + B2t )
−β2t min
(

















subject to: B1t + B
2
t ≤ qt+1, R1t + R2t ≤ St.
In Equation (1), the maximization of profit is over the target inventory decision. The first
term of the function is the production cost; the production also covers any backlogged orders
from the prior period. The second term is the profit in the remainder of the period (and
horizon) starting with the available inventory after production is completed and backorders
are fulfilled.
In Equation (2), the function Gt, the profit-to-go after production, is maximized over
the reserve inventory and backlogging decisions. The first element of the function is the
revenue from first-class customers, including both physical inventory and backlogged orders.
The second term is revenue from the second-class demand with available inventory and
backlogged orders. The third piece is the inventory holding cost to be paid for all inventory
not sold. The fourth and fifth terms represent inventory holding cost that is incurred for all
inventory reserved for the future. The sixth and seventh terms are the rejection penalties for
demand not satisfied for the first and second classes, respectively, and the eighth and ninth
terms are the delay penalty associated with the backlogged demand for the first and second
classes, respectively. The last term in the equation represents the profit in future periods,
sending forward any leftover physical inventory and backlogged orders. For period T , the
final term is replaced by the salvage cost of leftover inventory, namely υ(ST −D1T −D2T )+.
Finally, the constraints ensure that the manufacturer does not sell more future capacity
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than he has or reserve more inventory than is available.
2.2.2.1 Problem Simplifications
For each demand class, the manufacturer decides the amount of inventory to reserve and
the amount of backordering. To simplify the problem at hand, we show that in an optimal
policy for a class and a time period, at least one set of these decisions must be zero.
Lemma 2.1. In any optimal policy under the Priority Differentiation Strategy, we have:
(B1t + B
2
t ) ·R1t = 0 and B2t · (R1t + R2t ) = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
The first of these conditions says that if it is good to protect items for the future from
class 1 and lose some of the current demand, then it is not reasonable to backorder items
from class 1 or the lower-revenue class 2 (the contrapositive is also true). Likewise, the
second condition says that if it is good to backorder demand from even the (lower-paying)
second class in the current period, then it will not be reasonable to protect items from (and
lose demand from) the second class or the higher-paying first class in the current period
(the contrapositive is also true). The formal proof can be found in the Appendix.
By Lemma 2.1, the structure of the optimal policies can be simplified. In each period
there are three candidate policies, of which the best policy will be chosen; this choice will
be dependent on the state of the system. The possible options are to Reserve-Inventory
(R1t ≥ 0, R2t ≥ 0), to Backlog-Demand (B1t ≥ 0, B2t ≥ 0), or to Reserve-and-Backlog
(R2t ≥ 0, B1t ≥ 0). Thus,
Gt(St) = max{G1t (St), G2t (St), G3t (St)},
where G1t (St), G
2
t (St), and G
3
t (St) represent the profit-to-go with St units of products
available after production under the Reserve-Inventory policy, the Backlog-Demand policy
and the Reserve-and-Backlog policy, respectively. These three policies are given by:



































In each of the three cases, the starting inventory after production is completed and back-




t ), indicates the profit-to-go when
inventory may be protected from both classes (R1t , R
2
t ≥ 0). In this case the manufacturer
will not backlog orders of current customers because the backlog orders will reduce the
future capacity available to customers (therefore B1t = B
2
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t ) indicates the profit-to-go when backorders for each class
may be desirable (B1t , B
2
t ≥ 0). However, the manufacturer will not protect inventory from
either class (R1t = R
2
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t ), indicates the profit-to-go when the manufacturer
may backlog orders of the first class for future fulfillment (B1t ≥ 0) and may also protect
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In each period one of these three policies will be chosen, and this choice also impacts the
future state of the system. Intuition gives us some idea of when each policy will be selected,
which we establish more formally in our results below. We expect that the Reserve-Inventory
policy will be selected in a period where the marginal expected profit from selling each of
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the reserve units in the future is better than the net revenue of selling a unit now out of
inventory. For the Backlog-Demand policy, intuition suggests that it will be best when the
net revenue of backlogging in the current period is better than the marginal expected profit
from selling each of the units in the future. Finally, the Reserve-and-Backlog policy will
be optimal when the net revenue of backlogging to the first-class customers is significantly
greater than the marginal expected future profit of the backlogged units, but the second
class has a lower net revenue when selling from inventory than the marginal expected future
profit of sending forward reserved units.
2.2.2.2 Results
Under the Priority Differentiation Strategy, we can show that all the profit-to-go functions
have nice structure (quasi-concave or concave), thus yielding easy to implement decisions.
These results are summarized in the following theorem (see the Appendix for the full details):
Theorem 2.1. Under the Priority Differentiation Strategy,
• g1t (St, R1t , R2t ) is a quasi-concave function of R1t and R2t , for all t = 1, ..., T .
• g2t (St, B1t , B2t ) is a quasi-concave function of B1t and B2t , for all t = 1, ..., T .
• g3t (St, B1t , R2t ) is a quasi-concave function of B1t and R2t , for all t = 1, ..., T .
• Gt(St) is a concave function of St, for all t = 1, ..., T .
• Jt(It) is a concave function of It, for all t = 1, ..., T .
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In Section 2.2.1, while explaining the sequence of events, we assumed that the Rit and B
i
t
decisions are made after seeing the demand. In Theorem 2.1 we show that these decisions
are independent of the demand in the current period; thus, the manufacturer can decide
their optimal levels before the demand is revealed for the period. The theorem implies
the optimal policy for the Priority Differentiation Strategy; thus, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Given a vector of prices, there exists an optimal modified base-stock policy
for the Priority Differentiation Strategy with an optimal order-up-to level (S∗t ), and for
i = 1, 2 optimal reserve-up-to-levels (Ri
∗
t ) and optimal backlog-up-to levels (B
i∗
t ).
We refer to the policy as modified base-stock because it may be limited by capacity or
available inventory. If there is not sufficient capacity to bring the inventory level up to
S∗t , then as much as possible should be produced. Similarly, the Rit and Bit decisions are
limited by St and qt+1, respectively. The form of the optimal decisions are apparent from
the concavity and quasi-concavity of the profit functions. At each stage in the problem, the
manufacturer trades off the current net revenue against the marginal future contribution in
terms of cost or revenue and chooses the best allocation of resources.
Additional insight may be gained by looking at the optimal decisions in more detail.
The optimal decisions are defined by the following:1
S∗t = max{S : ct ≤ G′t(S)} if ct ≤ G′t(0)
R1
∗
t = max{I : p1t + `1t + ht ≤ J
′







t = max{I : p2t + `2t + ht ≤ J
′







t = min{I : J
′





t = min{I : J
′
t+1(−I) ≥ p2t + `2t − β2t } if p2t + `2t − β2t > J
′
t+1(0).
In Figure 1 we show the marginal expected profit in period t + 1 as a function of inven-
tory. According to the decisions described above, an optimal decision (e.g., the reservation
decision R1
∗





1Each decision is equal to 0 if the condition is never satisfied.
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cross the marginal expected profit curve. Figure 1(a) illustrates the reserve inventory deci-
sions, which correspond to the Reserve-Inventory policy in the previous section.
In the remaining figures, we show the marginal expected profit curve compared to the
costs relevant to the other optimal decisions above. The optimal backlogging decision is
portrayed in Figure 1(b); this decision corresponds to the Backlog-Demand Policy. Finally,
we show the optimal decision that results from Reserve-and-Backlog Policy in Figure 1(c).
A similar picture could be drawn for the target inventory decision comparing the production
cost (ct) with the derivative of the Gt function; this is left out for brevity. In all of the
decisions, we note that the manufacturer is trading off the certain net revenue in the current
period (e.g., p1t +`
1
t +ht) with a marginal expected profit in the future. Clearly there is some
risk with betting on the future, but such trade-offs are made regularly in many situations.
2.2.3 Special Cases and Extensions
We are also interested in situations in which manufacturers cannot differentiate customers
and treat them as a single class. We denote this situation as the Non-Differentiation Strategy
(NDS), which is a special case of PDS. We assume that the manufacturer takes the second-
class customers’ reservation price, p2t , as the selling price to all customers. Since the lower
price is charged to both classes, customers in both classes are willing to wait one period if
the item is not available to them, as in PDS. The difference of NDS from PDS is not in the
customers’ preferences, but in the manufacturer’s treatment of the customers. First-class
customers would be willing to pay extra if the manufacturer could differentiate, but he is
not able to or willing to differentiate. If we set D2t , R
2
t , and B
2
t to zero and replace D
1
t with
total demand in the formulation of PDS, we get NDS. Thus, the optimal policy is of the
form (S, R, B) as in PDS.
Initially, we analyzed the PDS problem for two customer classes under the assumption
that all backlogged orders are filled within one period. However, there are several more
general extensions that easily follow from our initial proof. Some of these extensions are
outlined below.
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• Multiple classes: Our results for PDS hold for a problem with more than two cus-
tomer classes. As before, it is necessary to assume that each class has priority in the
allocation of inventory and production capacity over the lower priority classes in the
current period. With this assumption, the nesting structure of the tactical inventory
decisions is still optimal. To be more specific, one could have a menu (price, priority
ranking) for each customer class. If there are many customer classes, it might be
difficult for customers to choose from the sets, and at the firm level, priority ordering
of many classes would also be difficult. However, it may be reasonable for 3 - 5 classes,
which can occur in some applications.
• Time-differentiated customers: It is also possible to extend the models to cover situa-
tions where some classes are always served immediately while others receive immediate
or delayed fulfillment. An example for this is a Time Differentiation Strategy (TDS),
where the first-class customers would never be willing to wait and are served imme-
diately, while the second-class customers can be served immediately or next period.
For this problem, the optimal policy is in the form of (S, Ri, B) for i = 1, 2, which is
a critical threshold policy as before. See Chapter 3 for details.
• Long Leadtime: The fulfillment leadtime in our analysis is assumed to be one period.
However, it is also possible to allow for planned backlogs where the orders can be
delivered anytime before the end of the time horizon. For the extended analysis,
we assume that backlogs must be filled before new orders are accepted, and under
this assumption our nested threshold policies are still optimal. If there is a leadtime
1 < lt < T−t in each period that specifies orders must be delivered in period t+lt, then
the problem is structurally more complex.2 In particular, the state space increases
since previous orders must be tracked so that they are fulfilled in the correct time
period. Furthermore, even if the expected profit is concave, the optimal policy may
be complex and not easy to implement.
2If l indicates that orders must be filled by period t+l, and previously-accepted orders must be filled before
new orders are accepted, then the results in this paper hold as described for planned backlogs. However, for
the version of the problem with specific and varying lt, the assumption that previous orders are filled first
may be too restrictive.
20
2.3 Computational Analysis
In this section we report on a computational study conducted to obtain insights about
the benefits of customer differentiation and tactical inventory use in PDS and NDS. Our
goal is to examine the relative performance of the policies of the (S, R, B) form in different
problem settings and identify the situations where this type of policy can provide significant
increases in profit.
The benchmark we use for each of our strategies is a traditional base-stock policy where
the manufacturer uses the modified order-up-to policy (S policy) and serves all customers
as in a single class. We assume that sales are lost if there is insufficient inventory on-hand
or if customers are rejected. We compare the performance of the (S,R, B) type policies over
the traditional policies using the metric of profit potential, as defined by 100∗ (V(S,R,B)VS −1),
where V indicates the expected profit of the problem being solved. In both the traditional
policy and NDS, we use p2t as the price charged to all customers to ensure that we serve to
both of the classes. This implies that PDS may show a big improvement in profit that is
due, in part, to the ability to differentiate customers.
The profit improvement of the Priority Differentiation Strategy compared to traditional
inventory policies comes from three sources: prioritized demand classes, differentiated pric-
ing, and shifting inventory to the next period, whereas the Non-Differentiation Strategy
only has the last source. Thus, by comparing both PDS and NDS to the traditional policy,
we can separate the impact of price differentiation versus tactical inventory.
2.3.1 Experiment Details
The total average demand from the first and second-class customers equals 100 in each
experiment. We assume that demand uncertainty is additive with a mean of 0. We define





denotes the standard deviation, and E denotes the expected value. In all cases shown, the
coefficient of variation of demand uncertainty is the same in each period and is equal to 0.2.
Production capacity is constant for a particular instance, while it is allowed to take the
values of 60% (low), 80% (med), and 100% (high) of the expected total average demand
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Table 3: Specific experimental data
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Avg
ct 70 90 70 50 70 90 70 50 70 90 70 50 70
p2t 90 110 90 70 90 110 90 70 90 110 90 70 90
p1t 110 130 110 90 110 130 110 90 110 130 110 90 110
for both classes over the horizon (denoted by Dem∗) in some experiments. The production
cost may vary by period, but the production cost vector is the same across instances. (We
also ran experiments where the production cost is the same in each period and obtained
similar results.) See Table 3 for the exact data; for example, the average markup of p2t (p
1
t )
over the cost is about 30%(60%) for the experiments on class proportions.
We study the impact of the percentage of first versus second-class demand in our first
set of experiments. In these cases the expected demand from first-class customers over the
horizon, E(D1), takes the values of 20, 25, 50, 75, and 80, and the expected second-class
demand, E(D2), equals 100−E(D1). The prices are constant over the set of experiments but
may vary by period. Having varying prices increases the likelihood that all of the policies
will be optimal in some period of an experiment, since the prices create an incentive to shift
capacity. The average ratio of p1t /p
2
t is 1.22 for the experiments studying the proportion of
demand. See Table 3 for the prices used in this set of experiments.
We also consider the relative price difference between classes. In these experiments E(p2)
is fixed over the instances, and the price for the first class is set according to E(p1)/E(p2) =
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, where E(pi) represents the average price over the horizon. We allow the
trend of p2t (and correspondingly, p
1
t ) to be either linearly increasing or decreasing (we also
ran experiments with no clear price trend). Let γ = p2t+1− p2t , which we assume to be fixed
for all t = 1...T − 1; γ shows the rate of change of price over time. For the increasing price
experiments, p21 = $70, and for the decreasing price experiments, p
2




For all experiments, the policies in PDS and NDS using tactical inventory have a higher
profit than the traditional policy. This is clear because of the usage of p2t for all customers
in the traditional policy. However, note that the profit difference is significant, even when
the E(D1) percentage is small (see Figure 2(a)).
The performance for a given proportion of first-class customers is better under the
tactical inventory policies when the capacities are tight. As an example, in Figure 2(a) the
performance of PDS when capacity is 0.6 Dem∗ is better than the performance of PDS
when capacity is 0.8 Dem∗. As expected for a given capacity level, the performance of
the tactical inventory policy in PDS increases almost linearly as the proportion of first-class
customers increases. This profit improvement is due to the additional revenue opportunities
that the tactical inventory policies have over the traditional policy including higher revenue
from first-class customers and an increased ability to meet demand by shifting capacity.
As expected, the profit under NDS is insensitive to the first-class proportion since it does
not differentiate between the classes. However, the significant profit improvement over the
traditional policy, even though both NDS and the traditional policy offer p2t to everyone,
suggesting that the tactical inventory may greatly improve profit. In our experiments,
production cost and prices are time varying and capacity is limited. When all parameters are
stationary over time and there is sufficient production capacity, the differentiation strategies
are unlikely to offer as much improvement over the traditional policy.
For several levels of price proportions (E(p1)/E(p2)), we look at the rate of price increase
(measured by γ) over the time horizon in Figure 2(b); the decreasing price trend showed
nearly the same results. Whether or not the pricing trend is increasing or decreasing,
the performance of the (S,Ri, Bi) policy relative to the traditional policy increases with
decreasing γ. To see this for the case of increasing prices, note in Figure 2(b) that the
performance of PDS when γ = 1 is better than the performance of PDS when γ = 4 at
every ratio of price differences between the classes. This result is somewhat surprising.
Looking at our results more closely, we find that as γ increases, the profits of PDS and
the traditional policy are both increasing because the mean prices are increasing. In fact,
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the absolute profit difference between the two strategies is increasing with γ. However, the
percentage profit improvement is not increasing with γ. This seems to be because the total
demand in each case is constant and the additional marginal profit from selling one more
unit in PDS is small relative to the overall increase in the profit of the traditional policy
when γ is large.
The values of the average tactical inventory levels for PDS and NDS are depicted in
Figures 3(a) and 3(b), respectively, for increasing prices. In the increasing price experiments
all three policies in PDS are active, while for decreasing prices (not shown) only the Backlog-
Demand Policy resulted. In some cases the magnitude of the average tactical inventory
increases with γ (that is, with increasing trend in price), but this is not true in all cases.
Note here that Figure 3 depicts average tactical inventory over the horizon, not necessarily
in each period. When we look at the solutions in more detail for increasing price trend, we
find that the reserve inventory is used in periods with lower prices and backlogging is used in
periods with higher prices. Thus, for each γ level in Figure 3, we have positive backlogging.
This is also due to the fact that the backlogging decision is comparing the net revenue from
a certain current customer with the marginal expected profit from a future customer. In
NDS all available tactical inventory decisions are employed, and in same cases (e.g. γ = 6),
the best value of R for NDS is approximately equal to R1t + R
2
t in PDS, suggesting that
NDS is partially compensating for limited flexibility with high values of tactical inventory
for the single customer class.
In the experiments thus far, we set the regular price to be p2t (in the traditional policy),
and some customers are willing to pay a higher price p1t for priority service (in PDS) over
no priority at regular price p2t . In this situation PDS clearly offers an advantage over the
traditional policy, since the average revenue is higher. However, it is also interesting to see
what happens when the regular price is p1t and some customers are willing to be served at
a lower priority for a discount, paying p2t . We show the results of these experiments with
increasing first-class demand in Figure 4(a), where the total number of expected customers
is 100 as before. Note here that PDS does not necessarily provide an improvement over
the traditional policy, since the average revenue per customer is less than in the traditional
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policy. When the first-class demand proportion is more than 50% and capacity is tight, we
see that PDS can have a higher profit than the traditional policy, even though the latter
has larger average revenue. This result suggests that tactical inventory to shift capacity
can overcome the average revenue decrease per customer in some cases. We also consider
experiments where the regular price (in the traditional policy) is the average of p1t and p
2
t in
each period, and PDS has some customers willing to pay more (p1t ) for higher priority and
some customers willing to have a lower priority for a price discount (p2t ). In this case we
see that PDS has greater profit than the traditional model in almost all cases, even though
the average revenue is less in PDS when the expected first-class demand is less than 50%
(see Figure 4(b)). The main insight from these graphs is that if prioritization of demand
classes costs a firm in the average revenue per customer, the benefit of tactical inventory
may outweigh the revenue loss.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed a multiple-class customer problem where production and tac-
tical inventory decisions must be made in every period and demand is a general stochastic
function of time and customer class. We have shown that there are a variety of problems
using tactical inventory decisions for which a threshold policy in each period is optimal
under a Priority Differentiation Strategy. Specifically, we have a modified base-stock pol-
icy consisting of the target inventory decision (S), the reserve-up-to levels (Ri), and the
backlog-up-to levels (Bi) for each demand class, or an (S,Ri, Bi) policy. Under prioritized
demand this policy is further nested by customer class.
The problem we model and analyze may also have application in other industries. For
instance, in some healthcare environments there may be multiple customer classes compet-
ing for time on a piece of equipment where priorities are based on the status of the illness.
In this problem, there may not be an explicit production decision, but one could still apply
backordering and reservation decisions such as promising to service a lower priority class
customer in a future time period.
Clearly the analysis in this chapter makes assumptions to simplify the problem, such
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as focusing on a single product. Yet these simplifications allow the development of an
optimal policy that is easy to understand, and more importantly, is easy to implement; and
the results have extensions beyond those focused on in this article. Further, the simple
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Figure 4: The relative performance of PDS over traditional with different prices
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CHAPTER III
POLICIES UTILIZING TACTICAL INVENTORY FOR SERVICE
DIFFERENTIATED CUSTOMERS
3.1 Introduction
Some manufacturing or retail companies now segment their customers according to service
and price, since it is not uncommon for customers to have different service and price pref-
erences and the differentiation may benefit the firms. For example, one class of customers
may be given immediate fulfillment while another class might receive delayed fulfillment for
a discount. For instance, if an executive’s laptop has been stolen he may pay a premium
for immediate delivery, while someone ordering a computer to go to college may order in
advance for a discount. Amazon.com also offers price and delivery time options where pay-
ing a price premium gives a customer immediate fulfillment while receiving a Super Saver
Shipping discount gives Amazon the opportunity for delayed fulfillment. This may provide
greater customer utility (either increased service or decreased price as desired by different
customers), while offering greater flexibility to the firm in managing the production system.
Though this can increase utility to the customer or the firm, it is necessary to analyze
how to manage the system, which may be more complicated due to the service differentia-
tion. One method to manage this kind of system is to use tactical inventory, where current
inventory may be set aside to satisfy future demand, and delayed fulfillment of current
customers (or “backlogs”) may be planned. Tactical inventory may increase profits while
ensuring that service of both kinds of customers is met.
The use of tactical inventory is considered in Scarf [68], in which the idea of protect-
ing inventory from being sold to current customers or “discretionary sales” is introduced.
Scarf showed that a base-stock policy is optimal for a single-class problem when production
setup costs are fixed, but that the optimal discretionary sales decision may be different for
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different demand realizations. Chan et al. [12] also incorporated the idea of tactical inven-
tory decisions for a single-class stochastic inventory model with multi-period pricing and
production decisions under limited capacity when demand is a general stochastic function.
They show that when the fixed production cost is zero, then the optimal discretionary sales
(or reserve inventory) is independent of the demand realization. However, when pricing is
a decision, then the discretionary sales decision does depend on the demand realization.
The use of tactical inventory was extended in Chapter 2 to allow the reserving of in-
ventory as well as planned backlogging of current customers as a second kind of tactical
inventory decision. In that chapter, we consider multiple customer classes differentiated
by their priority level, where the first-class customers receive complete priority over the
second-class customers in the use of current resources and future backlogging. A key fea-
ture of Chapter 2 is that customers in both of the classes behave homogeneously in terms
of the delivery time (all customers are willing to wait for fulfillment). The main result is
that policies of the (S,R, B) form are optimal, where S is the order-up-to quantity, R is the
reserve-up-to amount to protect from selling to current customers, and B is the backlog-
up-to amount. Since first and second-class customers can receive delayed fulfillment, the R
and B decisions may further be nested by customer class.
A fundamental difference in the current chapter compared to Chapter 2 is that in this
chapter the customer classes are differentiated according to their tolerance for delay fulfill-
ment, or “patience”. In the current chapter, customer classes are not ordered by priority
on resources. Although the proof techniques in this chapter are similar, the results do not
immediately follow from the models and analysis in Chapter 2 because the use of patient
and impatient customers changes the form of the models. Customers differentiated accord-
ing to their service preferences may be more applicable in certain settings, such as when
some customer types may have an immediate need for some products.
Other papers that consider serving multiple customer classes in a production system
include Deshpande et al. [21], Frank et al. [32], Gupta and Wang [38], and Sobel and
Zhang [73]. In most of these, the customer classes differ according to their priority or
fulfillment, and the authors look for policies to manage the system. However, a significant
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difference from ours is that tactical inventory decisions are not considered in these papers.
Although allowing tactical inventory may complicate the decision, previous work has shown
that it can add to the profits in a manufacturing environment by providing the ability to
shift demand ([12]).
We focus on a single product sold at a single manufacturer over a multi-period time
horizon, where the manufacturer has limited production capacity. First-class customers
claim the item immediately and never accept a delayed fulfilment and are willing to pay a
premium over the market price. Second-class customers are sensitive to price, always pay the
market price, and accept a delay fulfillment. We analyze the system where the manufacturer
can differentiate between the customer classes and service-discriminates according to their
preferences, and we also study a system where the manufacturer cannot discriminate and
does not serve the classes differently though customers accept or not according to their
service preferences. For both systems, the manufacturer decides in each period the amount
of inventory to protect from being sold to the current period’s demand and saved for future
demand, and the amount of demand to backlog as well as the overall production quantity.
We show that a modified base-stock policy in the form of (S,R, B) is optimal, whether the
manufacturer can or cannot differentiate between the customer classes.
3.2 Models and Results
3.2.1 Assumptions and Notation
We study a multi-period time horizon with periodic review where the periods are denoted
as t = 1, 2, . . . , T , with T being the end of the horizon. The production in each period t is
limited by the capacity, qt, and the manufacturer pays a production cost per unit of ct in
period t. The salvage value of any units left at the end of the horizon is υ. The inventory
holding cost per unit in period t, ht, is assessed to carry inventory from period t to t + 1.
The first-class customers (index of 1) are willing to pay a premium over the market price
for immediate delivery of the item and do not accept delayed fulfillment. The second-class
customers (index of 2) pay the market price, and they accept fulfillment delayed up to one
period; they can also be served before that deadline if resources are available. We assume
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that the firm has predetermined prices p1t and p
2
t to charge customer class 1 and 2 in period
t, respectively; the prices may be varying from period to period and are unknown to the
customers until the beginning of the period t, since in some companies pricing decisions are
made by the marketing department before the start of a selling season while production
decisions are made by the operations department. In period t, for i = 1, 2, `it is the penalty
per unit for demand in class i that is not satisfied and lost, and β2t is the penalty per unit
for items that are backlogged for delayed fulfillment. Penalty terms for the first class are
assumed to be higher than the second class.
We assume the demand of each class i in time period t, Dit, is a non-stationary stochastic
function; the probability and cumulative distribution functions (φit,Φ
i
t) are known, contin-
uous and differentiable; and that the customer classes are independent. We do not assume
particular forms of the demand functions.
The net inventory (on-hand inventory − backlogs) at the beginning of period t is It.
At the beginning of a period, the manufacturer checks the inventory level and decides the
production quantity; let St represent the inventory plus production in period t. We assume
products arrive immediately, and the manufacturer fulfills the backorders carried from the
previous period with the available inventory. (We allow backordered items to be delivered
no more than one period later, and we restrict backorders in each period to be no more than
the capacity in the next period; therefore, previously accepted orders are fulfilled before new
orders are accepted.) Then the demand is realized during the period, and at the end of the
period the manufacturer decides the amount of inventory to reserve for future sales and the
amount of backorders to be promised in the current period for future fulfillment. Then the
current demand is satisfied according to the inventory and backlogging decisions.
Let Jt(It) be the expected profit from period t forward to the end of the horizon when
starting at period t with It units in inventory, or the profit-to-go function. Let Gt(St) be the
expected profit-to-go from period t forward to the end of the horizon with St units of product
available (after production). The first and second derivatives of Jt(It) are denoted by J ′t(It)
and J ′′t (It), respectively. When the expected profit functions are specifically defined for a
strategy, they will have an additional superscript indicating the strategy.
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Table 4: Additional notation
S2t = (St −R1t −D1t )+ available inventory after first-class demand is satisfied
At = min(Bt, [D2t − [S2t −R2t ]+]+) actual backlogged orders
IR
1
t+1 = min(St, R
1








t ) inventory carried forward due to R
2 decision
I lowt+1 = [S
2
t −R2t −D2t ]+ inventory carried forward due to low demand
3.2.2 Time Differentiation Strategy
In the Time Differentiation Strategy (TDS), we assume that the manufacturer can differ-
entiate the customer classes by offering two time-differentiated services: selling the item for
p1t and delivering the item immediately, or selling the item for the discounted price p
2
t and
delivering the item no later than one period later.
Let Bt be the maximum planned backorders in period t to fulfill from future capacity. In
period t, R1t is the inventory to protect from being sold to first and second-class customers,
and R2t is the additional inventory to protect from being sold to second-class customers;
thus, the total amount to protect from class 2 in period t is R1t + R
2
t . For convenience,
define S2t to be the amount of inventory available to the second-class customers in period
t, the actual backlogged orders from second-class customers after all demand is satisfied in
period t from available inventory as At, and inventory carried forward to period t+1 due to




t+1, respectively. If total demand is sufficiently
low so that there is leftover inventory at the end of period t, we denote this inventory as
I lowt+1. See Table 4 for a summary of the additional notation.
In each period, after the demand for both classes of customers are revealed, the max-
imum number of first-class customers is satisfied from the available inventory on hand
immediately1, and the second-class customers are satisfied from the available inventory left
over after the first-class demand is satisfied and from the available backlog amounts2.
We model this resource allocation problem with service-differentiated customers as a
1The usage of on-hand inventory for a second-class demand instead of a first-class one is obviously sub-
optimal.
2The second-class customers may be satisfied immediately if there is inventory, since it avoids the inven-
tory holding cost and backlogging penalty for those customers.
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Markov decision process, where the state of the system is represented by the net inventory.
We can now write the optimal expected profit in period t for the Time Differentiation
Strategy as the following recursive equation:
JTDSt (It) = max
St:max(0,It)≤St≤It+qt
{
−ct(St − It) + GTDSt (St)
}
, and (3)
GTDSt (St) = max
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Equation (3) includes production cost and the remaining profit-to-go after production
(Equation (4)), which is maximized over the tactical inventory (R1t , R
2
t ) and backlogging
(Bt) decisions. The first terms in Equation (5) include the revenue from first-class customers
from the available inventory and the revenue from the second-class demand from available
inventory and planned backlogging. The second line (third, fourth and fifth terms) includes
the holding cost for leftover inventory and for the two reserving inventory decisions. The
sixth and seventh terms, respectively, are the rejection penalties for unsatisfied first and
second-class demand, and the eighth term is the delay penalty for backlogged demand. The
last term in the equation is the profit-to-go in future periods, as a function of any leftover
physical inventory and backlogged orders. For the last period of the horizon (T ), the final
term is replaced by υ(ST − D1T − D2T )+, which includes the salvage cost for the leftover
inventory. The constraints ensure that the manufacturer does not backlog more future
capacity than he has in the next period or reserve more inventory than is available.
To simplify the TDS problem, we show that in an optimal policy, in every period ei-
ther the amount of inventory protected from the second-class customers or the amount of
backlogged demand of the second-class demand must equal zero (or both).
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Lemma 3.1. In any optimal policy under the Time Differentiation Strategy, we have:
Bt · (R1t + R2t ) = 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
See the Appendix for details about proofs. To see the result intuitively, suppose that
(R1t + R
2
t ) > 0, which means that the manufacturer may reject some current second-class
demand in period t in order to reserve some inventory for period t + 1. Then it is intuitive
that it would not be optimal for the manufacturer to use the inventory in period t + 1 to
fulfill any current second-class demand in period t, thus we will have Bt = 0. The intuitive
explanation for the case with Bt > 0 is similar.
Lemma 3.1 implies that the structure of the optimal policies can be simplified as fol-
lows. In each period, the manufacturer can choose one of two policies: either the Reserve-
Inventory policy with R1t + R
2
t ≥ 0, or the Backlog-Demand policy with Bt ≥ 0. Thus,







where GTDS−Rt (St), and G
TDS−B
t (St) represent the profit-to-go with St units of products
available after production under the Reserve-Inventory policy and the Backlog-Demand
policy, respectively. These policies are defined by



















gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt)
}
.
We will address the structural results and corresponding policies for these models in Section
3.3, after introducing the non-differentiating strategy.
3.2.3 Common Service Strategy
In some cases, even though the manufacturer knows the existence of multiple classes of
customers, he may not be able or willing to treat customers differently. In such environ-
ments, the manufacturer manages the customers as a single class, and attempts to serve
each customer with the same service strategy. We model the problem of a manufacturer who
does not differentiate between two classes of customers with the Common Service Strategy
(CSS), where the manufacturer serves customers with a first-come-first-serve rule and offers
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all customers a one-period backlog for the item if the on-hand inventory is depleted. The
second-class customers will accept the delayed fulfillment, but the first-class demand is lost
if it is not fulfilled immediately; all customers are willing to accept immediate fulfillment.
We assume the manufacturer takes the second-class customers’ reservation price, p2t , as
the selling price to all customers, although our results also hold under other prices. The





the total demand has the probability and cumulative distribution functions (φ1,2t ,Φ
1,2
t ). We





t ]. We assume that the customer classes are distributed homogeneously
across a time period in accordance with αt.3 Let `t be rejection penalty in a period t; e.g., in
our calculations we use `t as the weighted average rejection penalty (`t = (1−αt)`1t +αt`2t ),
but other values can also be used. In each period t, the manufacturer decides Bt, the amount
of planned backlogging in the current period; Rt, the inventory to protect from being sold
in the current period; and St, the target level of inventory. The optimal decisions are found
by solving the profit-to-go function under the Common Service Strategy:
JCSSt (It) = max
St:max(0,It)≤St≤It+qt
{
−ct(St − It) + GCSSt (St)
}
, and (6)
GCSSt (St) = max
Rt:Rt≤St; Bt:Bt≤qt+1
gCSSt (St, Rt, Bt) where, (7)




t , St −Rt + min(Bt, αt(D1,2t − St + Rt)+))
−ht max(Rt, St −D1,2t )− β2t min(Bt, αt(D1,2t − St + Rt)+) (8)
−`1t (1− αt)min(Bt/αt, (D1,2t − St + Rt)+)− `t(D1,2t − St + Rt −Bt/αt)+





Equations (6) and (7) are as described before, except in the CSS strategy the latter is
optimized over fewer reserving decisions; other differences are as below. The selling revenue
includes items from both classes sold immediately, and any items backlogged from the
second class only. Delay penalties are charged for backlogged second-class demand, and
penalties are paid for first-class demand not satisfied immediately. The fourth term is the
3Note that if this assumption does not hold, the model becomes an approximation of the true situation.
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penalty associated with the lost first-class demand who are offered delayed fulfillment but
are not willing to accept it, and the fifth term is the rejection penalty for demand beyond
the acceptance level for both classes. The last term in Equation (8) is again the profit-to-go,
and constraints are as before.
Next we show that in an optimal policy, in any period, either the amount of reserved
inventory equals zero or the amount of backlogged demand equals zero, i.e., they cannot
both be positive.
Lemma 3.2. In any optimal policy under the Common Service Strategy, we have Rt·Bt = 0,
for t = 1, 2, ..., T .
This is similar to the result for TDS, except now it applies to the reserving decision that
is common to the two customer classes.
As before, with Lemma 3.2, the structure of the optimal policies can be simplified.
Under the Common Service Strategy, in any period the manufacturer chooses one of two
policies: either he protects inventory for the future and does not backlog current demand
(Rt ≥ 0, Bt = 0), called the Reserve-Inventory policy, or he backlogs current demand but
does not save items for the future (Bt ≥ 0, Rt = 0), called the Backlog-Demand policy.
Thus,







GCSS−Rt (St) = max
Rt:0≤Rt≤St
{
gCSSt (St, Rt, 0)
}
and GCSS−Bt (St) = max
Bt:0≤Bt≤qt+1
{
gCSSt (St, 0, Bt)
}
.
There are similarities in the structure of the results for TDS and CSS, although the
models have several important differences. In the next section we further analyze similarities
in the structure.
3.3 Results
Under both the Time Differentiation Strategy and the Common Service Strategy, we can




t , 0), g
TDS
t (St, 0, 0, Bt), g
CSS
t (St, Rt, 0),
and gCSSt (St, 0, Bt) are quasi-concave, each of them has a unique unconstrained optimizer
that is independent of the inventory level St, and the expected profit Jt(It) and Gt(St) are
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concave functions of inventory It and St respectively. These results are summarized in the
following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. For all t = 1, ..., T ,
• gTDSt (St, R1t , R2t , 0) is a jointly quasi-concave function of R1t and R2t , and gCSSt (St, Rt, 0)
is a quasi-concave function of Rt,
• gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt) and gCSSt (St, 0, Bt) are quasi-concave functions of Bt,
• GTDSt (St) and GCSSt (St) are concave functions of St,
• JTDSt (It) and JCSSt (It) are concave functions of It,
• The unconstrained optimizers (R1∗t , R2
∗
t , and B
∗

























B∗t (St) = argmax
Bt:0≤Bt
{
gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt)
}
.
• The unconstrained optimizers (R∗t and B∗t ) for gCSSt (St, Rt, 0) and gCSSt (St, 0, Bt) are
independent of inventory level St, where
R∗t (St) = argmax
Rt:0≤Rt
{
gCSSt (St, Rt, 0)
}
, B∗t (St) = argmax
Bt:0≤Bt
{
gCSSt (St, 0, Bt)
}
.
Theorem 3.1 implies an optimal policy for both the Time Differentiation Strategy and
the Common Service Strategy that has a similar form, and thus we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Given a vector of prices, there exists an optimal policy for





t ), and an optimal backlog-up-to level (B
∗
t ),
• the Common Service Strategy with an optimal order-up-to level (S∗t ), an optimal
reserve-up-to-level (R∗t ) and an optimal backlog-up-to level (B∗t ).
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Note that for CSS there is a single reserve inventory decision that non-discriminatingly
applies to both classes of customers, and similarly for the planned backlogging decisions,
while for TDS there are separate values for reserving that apply to each class and the
planned backlogging only applies to the second-class demand. However, in both cases the
form of the optimal policy is (S, R,B). In both cases the optimal policies are considered
to be modified base stock ones, because the realized values may be limited by capacity
or available inventory. The results also show that the optimal inventory decisions are
independent of the realized demand, which implies that the decisions could also have been
made before the exact demand realization.
Examining the decisions in more detail provides more information on their meaning.
The optimal decisions for CSS are defined by the following:
S∗t = max{S : ct ≤ G
′ CSS
t (S)} if ct ≤ G
′ CSS
t (0)
R∗t = max{I : p2t + `t + ht ≤ J
′ CSS
t+1 (I)} if p2t + `t + ht < J
′ CSS
t+1 (0) (9)
B∗t = min{I : J
′ CSS
t+1 (−I) ≥ p2t + `2t − β2t } if p2t + `2t − β2t > J
′ CSS
t+1 (0),
and the optimal decisions for TDS that are different from CSS are given by:
R1
∗
t = max{I : p1t + `1t + ht ≤ J
′ TDS







t = max{I : p2t + `2t + ht ≤ J
′ TDS
t+1 (I)} if p2t + `2t + ht < J
′ TDS
t+1 (0).
For each decision, if the condition is not satisfied, then the decision variable equals zero.
In each case, a decision is found by comparing the net revenue from gaining or losing a
customer with the marginal expected profit of an additional unit in the future (pit + `
i
t + ht
is the net revenue of selling to customer class i from inventory, pit + `
i
t − βit is the net
revenue from backlogging an i class customer, and J ′(I) is the marginal expected profit of
an additional unit above I). This is also apparent from examining the decisions for TDS
that are pictured in Figure 5 (the ones for CSS are similar in structure).
Chapter 2 examined the form of the optimal policies when customers are differentiated
by priority level and behave homogeneously with respect to delayed fulfillment. In that











Figure 5: Optimal Decisions for TDS under the Optimal Policies
and policies resulted from the model. An obvious difference is that in the current research
only one backlogging decision results, since only the second-class customers are willing to
accepted delayed fulfillment. Another difference is that in Chapter 2, one submodel that
we found could be optimal was the Reserve-and-Backlog Policy, where both a backlogging
and reserving decision could be positive in the current period, but that is not true for the
TDS and CSS models.
Numerical experiments of the TDS and CSS policies in the next section show that
significant profit improvement can be achieved with the tactical inventory, especially when
production capacity is limited.
3.4 Computational Analysis
To further analyze the impacts of time differentiation and the corresponding tactical in-
ventory decisions, we perform a computational study. The benchmark against which we
compare TDS and CSS is a traditional production and inventory problem with limited
capacity and no tactical inventory decisions with all customers served as a single class
(unsatisfied demand is lost).
We compare the performance of the (S, R,B) type policies over the traditional policies
using the metric of profit potential, as defined by 100 ∗ (V(S,R,B)VS − 1), where V indicates the
expected profit of the problem being solved. In CSS and the traditional policy, we charge
price p2t to all customers. This implies that TDS may show a big improvement in profit
that is due, in part, to the ability to differentiate customers.
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The profit improvement of the Common Service Strategy compared to the traditional
inventory policy comes from a single source: the tactical inventory (reserving and planned
backlogging), whereas the Time Differentiation Strategy has both tactical inventory as well
as differentiated pricing. Thus, by comparing both TDS and CSS to the traditional policy,
we can separate the impacts of price differentiation versus tactical inventory.
3.4.1 Experiment Details
In each experiment, the average total demand from first and second-class customers is 100,
which we refer to as Dem∗. We assume that demand uncertainty is additive with a mean
of 0. Since demand variation is usually proportional to average demand, we set the ratio
between the standard deviation and the expectation to be 20% in each period.
Production capacity is constant throughout the planning horizon of an instance. Across
experiments we use three values of production capacity: 60 (low), 80 (med), and 100 (high).
The production cost may vary by period, but the production cost vector is the same across
instances. See Table 5 for the exact data; for example, the average markup of p2t (p
1
t ) over
the cost is about 30% (60%) for the experiments on class proportions.
We study the impact of proportion of the second class customers, αt, in our first set
of experiments. We let αt take the values of 0.2, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.8 which corresponds to
the expected demand from second-class customers over the horizon taking the values of 20,
25, 50, 75, and 80. The prices vary by period but are the same across all experiments.
This creates the likelihood that different submodels will be optimal in a particular instance.
The average ratio of p1t /p
2
t is 1.22 for the experiments studying the proportion of demand.
See Table 5 for the prices used in this set of experiments; the data was chosen so that
comparisons can be made between the models in this chapter and the models in Chapter 2.
3.4.2 Results
Observe that the relative performance of CSS and TDS for a given proportion of second-
class customers (αt) is better when capacity is tight. As an example, in Figure 6(a) the
performance of TDS when capacity is 0.6 Dem∗ is better than the performance of TDS
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Table 5: Specific experimental data
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Avg
ct 70 90 70 50 70 90 70 50 70 90 70 50 70
p2t 90 110 90 70 90 110 90 70 90 110 90 70 90
p1t 110 130 110 90 110 130 110 90 110 130 110 90 110
when capacity is 0.8 Dem∗. The figure also shows that impact on TDS and CSS as αt
increases. Not surprisingly, the relative performance reduction in TDS as αt increases can
easily be explained by the loss of additional revenue opportunities from first-class customers.
CSS performs better as the proportion of second-class customers increases. This is in
part because more customers are willing to accept delayed fulfillment, and it may also be
explained increased flexibility in the managing of demand due to backlogging.
The figure also shows the impact of tactical inventory, seen by comparing CSS to the
traditional policy, since both offer p2t to all customers. The profit improvement is 17% or
more in the figures.
In order to see the value of being able to differentiate between the customer classes,
we set the price p1t , that is charged to the first-class customers, to p
2
t in Figure 6(b). We
observe a profit improvement as high as 6% over CSS even though the same price is charged
to everyone. The main insight from Figure 6(b) is that even though the price that will
be charged to the first-class customers are close to the market price, there is a significant
amount of profit improvement opportunity for the manufacturer from the flexibility that is
gained.
Another interesting observation from the graphs is that the profit function is not linear
with respect to the second-class proportion of demand. This may even suggest that if firms
are able to change the mix of customers in their market, that this has the most impact
when the proportion of first and second-class customers is approximately the same.
3.5 Conclusions
Many companies today provide differentiated service so that some customers are served
immediately while others receive delayed fulfillment for a discount. Customers receive higher
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utility, and the company may gain flexibility to improve operations. We address such a
situation in this chapter where the first-class customers require immediate service and pay
a premium for immediate response from the firm, and the second-class customers accept
delayed fulfillment and pay the market price. We investigate where the firm has the ability
to differentiate the customer classes or does not (Time Differentiation Strategy and Common
Service Strategy, respectively).
We consider these problems in a stochastic production and inventory context, and we use
tactical and planned inventory decisions in order to allocate scarce inventory and production
resources effectively. We show that for general stochastic demand functions the optimal
policies for both TDS and CSS are modified base-stock policies in the form of (S,R, B),
where S is the optimal order-up-to level, R denotes the optimal reserve-up-to levels, and B
is the optimal backlog-up-to levels.
This chapter contributes to the literature on operational models to manage markets
with segmented demand, and it shows the impact of one kind of flexibility in the production
system. Additional research would also be helpful in showing how to manage systems with
segmented demand. For instance, pricing can be used to determine the size of the customer
classes in response to variability, and policies to manage systems with extended leadtimes
and multiple classes is another. The area is rich and has many applications in modern
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LEADTIME QUOTATION AND ORDER ACCEPTANCE WHEN
DEMAND DEPENDS ON SERVICE PERFORMANCE
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate a firm’s leadtime quotation decisions when its recent per-
formance of meeting quoted leadtimes affects the arrival of future orders. As customers
increasingly look for better and faster service, when choosing a supplier they consider both
the length and the “reliability” of the quoted leadtimes. While short leadtimes are desir-
able, the reliability of the quoted leadtimes (i.e., the supplier’s ability to meet the promised
due dates, or “service level”) is equally important, especially for business customers. A
late delivery from a supplier can shut down a manufacturing line, for example, costing the
customer of that supplier millions of dollars. 78% of companies which operate in a just-in-
time environment in the U.S. ranked delivery reliability as high priority, whereas only 25%
ranked price as high priority (Billesbach et al. [9]).
Suppliers can pay high penalties for late deliveries, and these penalties usually increase
with the delay. For example, Real World Components offers a 105% delivery guarantee, i.e.,
customers get the return price plus 5% if their order does not arrive on time (Carbone [11]).
Besides the immediate monetary impact of such penalties, late deliveries can also damage
the image of the supplier and reduce the arrivals of future orders. Repeat customers keep
track of the firms’ “service level” through various means and consider the recent delivery
performance of a seller when deciding whether or not to place an order. For example, as
Silicon Graphics Inc. (a leader in the three-dimensional graphics computers in the 1990’s)
began to lose its technological edge, it started to lose customers and revenues due to not
meeting the leadtimes quoted to the customers. As stated in the cover story of Business
Week Online ( Hof et al. [43]), longtime SGI loyal customers started to drop SGI since they
stopped believing SGI salespeople’s insistence that they would ship on time. Similarly, even
47
for one-time retail customers, sites such as pricegrabber.com provide merchant ratings that
allow customers to access e-tailers’ past delivery performance.
While recent research on leadtime decisions has considered the impact of the quoted
leadtime on a customer’s decision to place an order, much has ignored the impact of the
seller’s past performance in meeting the promised delivery dates. However, as the examples
above indicate, in today’s environment with easily accessible information about sellers’ de-
livery performances, both the length and also the reliability of the quoted leadtimes impact
customers’ decisions in choosing a supplier. In this chapter, we model customers’ sensitivity
to the reliability as well as the duration of the quoted leadtimes, and we demonstrate how
to quote leadtimes and determine how many orders to accept in infinite and finite capacity
settings. We show that the impact of ignoring past service can be significant, including
the quotation of “unethical leadtimes” or even going out of business, while incorporating
service performance can increase revenue significantly. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first in the leadtime literature to consider the impact of the firm’s past performance
in meeting delivery promises on the arrival of future orders.
4.2 Literature Review
Most due date management policies proposed in the early literature assume that customers
accept the quoted leadtimes (due dates) regardless of their duration (Baker [2], Baker and
Bertrand [3], Enns [25], Fry et al. [33], Hopp and Roof Sturgis [44], Miyazaki [60], Spearman
and Zhang [74], Weeks [86], Wein [87]). Many of these papers propose a two-step approach:
assign the due dates first, and then schedule the orders using a priority dispatch policy
such as first come first serve, shortest processing time, earliest due date, etc. A common
approach for setting due dates is to use dispatch due date rules which follow the general
form dj = rj + fj where dj , rj , and fj are the due date, the release time, and the flow
allowance for job j. The tightness of the flow allowances (and the due dates) is usually
controlled by some parameters. To ensure that the assigned leadtimes are reliable to the
extent possible, they either include a lateness penalty in the objective function or impose
a service level constraint, such as the average fraction of tardy jobs or maximum expected
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tardiness (e.g., see [44], [74], [87]).
In most businesses, the quoted leadtimes (or due dates) and price affect the customers’
decisions to place an order. Equivalently, the firm has the choice of accepting or rejecting an
order. For example, a customer with a firm deadline may not place the order if the quoted
due date exceeds the deadline. In general, the longer the quoted leadtime, the less likely that
a customer will place an order. Recent papers in the literature that study leadtime decisions
capture the impact of the quoted leadtimes on demand, assuming that the probability that
an arriving customer places an order decreases as the quoted leadtime increases (Chatterjee
et al. [15], Dellaert [18], Duenyas [23], Duenyas and Hopp [24], Slotnick and Sobel [69]) or
the customer does not place an order if the quoted due date exceeds the customer’s deadline
(Charnsirisakskul et al. [13], Keskinocak et al. [48]). Hence, due date quotation decisions
are considered together with order acceptance decisions, taking a profit maximization rather
than a cost minimization perspective. In general, the revenue from an accepted order (in
class j) is R (Rj) and there are earliness/tardiness penalties if the order is completed
before/after its quoted due date. Let P (l) denote the probability that a customer places
an order given quoted lead time l and let lmax denote the maximum acceptable leadtime to
the customer. The proposed demand models in the literature include the following:
(D1) : P (l) = 1− l/lmax




1, if l ≤ lmax
0, otherwise
(D3) : P (l) = e−λl, where λ is the arrival rate of the customers
(D4) : P (l) is a decreasing concave function of l
The paper that is most closely related to this chapter is [24], where the authors consider
demand models (D2)-(D4). They first consider a system with infinite server capacity and
for the special case of exponential processing times and model (D3), they find a closed form
solution for the optimal leadtime. Next, they consider the capacitated case studying a single
server queue GI/GI/1 where processing times have a distribution in the form of increasing
failure rate (IFR). They first study the problem for model (D2) where the firm’s main
decision is to decide which orders to accept (reject), by quoting a leadtime less (greater)
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than lmax. They show that the optimal policy has a control-limit structure: for any n, the
number of orders currently in the system, there exists a time t(n) such that a new order is
accepted if the first order has been in service for more than t(n) time units. For model (D4)
and an M/M/1 queue, they show that the optimal leadtime to quote is increasing in n. [23]
extends some of these results to multiple customer classes, with different net revenues and
leadtime preferences.
We extend the infinite capacity model in [24] to incorporate service. It is interesting to
note that when the impact of the service on future arrivals is ignored, the firm might find
it profitable to quote “unethical” leadtimes, even if there is a service constraint. Spearman
and Zhang [74] study the leadtime quotation problem with the objective of minimizing the
weighted average leadtime subject to an upper bound on the average tardiness. They show
that it is optimal to quote a zero leadtime if the congestion level is above a certain threshold,
even though the possibility of meeting this quote is extremely low. Intuitively, when the
system is congested, an arriving job will be late with high probability, unless a very long
leadtime is quoted. However, long leadtimes negatively affect the objective function. Since
the service level is on the number of tardy jobs, when the system is congested it is preferable
to simply quote a zero leadtime, adding to the number of tardy jobs but keeping the objective
function value low. Using numerical examples, the authors show that a customer is more
likely to be quoted a zero leadtime when the service level is low or moderate, rather than
high, creating service expectations completely opposite of what the system can deliver. In
contrast, we show that when the firm considers the impact of service on future arrivals, it
is never profitable to quote a zero leadtime.
Another stream of recent papers within the due date management literature considers
due date and price decisions simultaneously (Boyaci and Ray [10], Charnsirisakskul et al.
[14], Palaka et al. [62], Ray and Jewkes [64], So [71], So and Song [72]). There is also a small
but growing literature considering leadtime (and price) decisions within a decentralized
marketing-operations framework ([15], Pekgun et al. [63]). However, in contrast to our
dynamic setting, most of these papers study queuing models focusing on a common due
date in steady state.
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In all the papers cited in the due date management literature above, current performance
in service quality (meeting the quoted leadtimes) does not affect future customer arrivals.
There are studies in the economics and operations management literature that consider the
effect of service quality on the future market share. In the economics literature, Deneckere
and Peck [19] report a positive correlation between price charged and service quality in a
two-stage game where service quality is measured by per customer capacity. Liebeskind and
Rumelt [53] consider a case where firms have the option of selecting to be a high or low-
quality producer and show that the firm will be honest about his choice of service level only
if the price charged to the customers is equal to their reservation price. In the operations
management literature, Mendelson and Whang [58], Stidham [77] and van Mieghem [82]
use queueing settings for single firms to optimize the system wide performance via price
mechanisms where delay in queue or system is used as the quality measure. Hall and
Porteus [41] utilize a simple dynamic model to investigate the behavior of the firm where
firms compete by investing in capacity (and capacity implies the delivered service quality).
Gans [36] focuses on the firm’s choice of mean service quality by considering the long-run
average profit, where a customer chooses a firm using the history of the service quality he
received so far. Similar to [36], we also consider a single static decision that affects the
service level to be consistent with the industry practice of stationary targets for service
levels instead of allowing the firm to change service levels in response to short-term changes
as in [41]. While [41] and [36] study (in a game theoretic setting) a closed system where
n customers switch from one firm to another, we consider an open system in a queueing
setting.
In this chapter we extend the literature on leadtime quotation decisions by considering
the impact of the firm’s ability to meet the quoted leadtimes on future arrivals as well as the
impact of the quoted leadtime on the probability of an arriving customer’s order placement
decision. For a recent review of due date management policies, see Keskinocak and Tayur
[49].
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4.3 Models and Results
We study leadtime quotation decisions in a stochastic environment where a leadtime, `,
is quoted to each arriving customer and the customer’s probability of placing an order
decreases in the quoted leadtime. We make the following modeling assumptions:
• the expected arrival rate of the customers is λ(s), where λ can be interpreted as the
base arrival rate and λ(s) is an increasing function of the service level;
• the service time of an order is exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ;
• placed orders create an immediate revenue of R;
• on-time completion of an order improves, whereas late completion of an order degrades
the service level, s, of the firm; and
• if an order is not completed on-time the firm incurs a penalty, c, per unit time, i.e.,
the total penalty paid by the firm for a late order is proportional to the length of the
delay.
We consider two decision models, namely, Naive and Service-Sensitive. In the Naive
model, the firm makes leadtime decisions assuming that the arrival distribution of the
customers is stationary throughout time (i.e., the arrival rate is constant and does not
depend on the firm’s performance in meeting the quoted leadtimes). By contrast, in the
Service-Sensitive model the firm takes into account the fact that the future arrival rate of
the customers is directly affected by whether or not past orders were completed on time.
We study these models under infinite and finite capacity settings, analyze optimal leadtime
quotation policies, and investigate the impact of the customers’ service sensitivity on the
firm’s leadtime decisions and profits.
4.3.1 Infinite Capacity Case
When the firm’s capacity is unlimited (equivalently, if the firm has a high number of servers),
upon placing an order each customer is assigned a server and the service of the order starts
immediately. If a leadtime ` is quoted to an arriving customer, the customer’s probability
of placing an order is p(`) = e−α`, where 1/α can be thought of as the mean leadtime
acceptable to customers (as in [69]). We assumed that the service level s takes continuous
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values between zero and one (zero indicates the lowest and one indicates the highest service
level), and the expected arrival rates of the customers, λ(s), is linear in service level with
highest arrival rate of λ. The expected arrival rate of the customer is assumed to be linear
in s, and its In the long-run, the service level s is the probability of meeting the quoted
leadtime, `, where s = 1− e−µ`.
If the firm is Naive, it ignores the impact of the service level on the arrival rate and
assumes that the customers arrive at the base (expected) arrival rate λ. In this case the
optimal leadtime is found by solving ΠN = max`≥0 e−αl
(
R− ∫∞l c(y − l)µe−µydy
)
λ and







(see [24]). Note that if R ≥ (µ+α)cαµ , then
`N = 0.
Observation 4.1. If the revenue per order is sufficiently large and the firm ignores the
impact of the service level on future arrivals (or if the customers are insensitive to the
service level), then this leads to the quotation of “unethical” leadtimes where every order is
delivered late (see [74] for a discussion on unethical leadtimes).
Clearly, quoting a zero leadtime to every arriving customer while there is no hope of
meeting such a promise is not an ethical business practice, even if it means attracting many
customers and maximizing profits in the short-term. Furthermore, what is the impact of
such a behavior (or ignorance) on the firm’s long-term profitability?
To answer this question, we next consider the leadtime decisions of a Service-Sensitive












Theorem 4.1. For a Service-Sensitive firm,
(i) the optimal leadtime to quote is `∗ = 1µ (ln (θ))
+, where




(ii) `∗ is decreasing in R and limR→∞ `∗ = 1µ ln(
α+µ
α ) > 0;
(iii) `∗ > `N .
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The proofs of all the results are presented in the Appendix. From Theorem 4.1, a
Service-Sensitive firm quotes strictly positive leadtimes, which are always longer (i.e., more
conservative) than the ones quoted by the Naive firm. While such longer leadtimes might
decrease the number of orders placed upon arrival, serving fewer orders increases the firm’s
service level and positively impacts the arrival stream in the long term. Hence, the Service-
Sensitive firm projects a more reliable (or ethical) image to the customers in terms of
meeting its delivery promises.
In Figure 7, we show a numerical example that compares the profits of the Naive and
Service-Sensitive firms. From Figure 7(a) and (b), as the revenue per order (R) increases, the
deviation from the optimal leadtime increases while the service level significantly decreases
(and eventually reaches zero) if the firm ignores the customers’ sensitivity to the service
performance. From Figure 7(c), the firm’s profit increases in R when the optimal leadtime
`∗ is quoted; however, ignoring customers’ sensitivity to the service performance leads to a
significant loss of profit, and for large R values, causes the firm to lose all of its customers
and go out of business. There are many business cases which fit this scenario. For example,
consider eToys.com. According to USA Today (Krantz [50]) “Last year [1999], eToys and
others were beset with delivery snafus. That hurt holiday sales this year.” eToys made
unrealistic delivery promises in 1999, which it could not meet, and infuriated customers
who swore to never purchase from eToys again (as stated in online merchant reviews [59]).
eToys closed its doors in 2001.
One might question whether it is possible to achieve the efficient system outcome (that
is, incorporating customer behavior) by modifying the penalty cost (c). Figures 8(a) and
2(b) show the effect of c on the long-run service level and profit for both a Naive and a
Service-Sensitive firm. One has to charge a very high penalty cost (to include both the
immediate penalty and reputation or word-of-mouth) to capture some of the overall effects
of the customers’ service sensitivity. For instance, when the penalty cost is 30%, 50%, 75%,
100% of the revenue, the profit and the service level of the Service-Sensitive firm are 162%,
19%, 6%, 3% and 257%, 33%, 11%, 5% higher than that of the Naive firm, respectively. Note


















Figure 7: Performance based on revenue per item when α = 0.2, µ = 0.5, c = 2
beyond impacting future customer arrivals; for example, they might increase the customers’
willingness to pay leading to higher revenues (and profits).
It is also useful to consider how the Naive and Service-Sensitive firms perform when
they make a mistake in estimating the penalty cost c. Figure 8(c) shows the percentage
profit loss if a different cost than the actual c is used by either firm. Underestimating the
penalty cost (or even using the actual) is detrimental to the Naive firm’s profits, while the
Service-Sensitive firm’s profits are quite robust for a large range (±100%) of penalty cost






















(c) Percentage profit loss from using a different
























(d) Percentage profit difference between Service-
Sensitive and Naive firms for different α values
Figure 8: Performance based on penalty cost when α = 0.5, µ = 0.5, R = 2
higher profit loss for the Service-Sensitive firm than the Naive firm, which is expected since
the overestimation acts as a “correction” for the Naive firm’s ignorance of the customers’
service sensitivity. Overall, the profit of the Naive firm is significantly more sensitive to the
choice of c than that of the Service-Sensitive firm.
A key factor in a firm’s performance can be its “relative” capacity, which depends on
the mean leadtime (1/α) acceptable to customers and the mean service time (1/µ) (note
that a higher α value corresponds to the customers’ desire for shorter leadtimes, and hence,
effectively lower capacity). Figure 8(d) illustrates that the percentage profit difference
between Service-Sensitive and Naive firms is higher when the capacity is tight (1/α < 1/µ)
and significant even when c is close to R. For example, for c = 0.5R, the percentage profit
difference is 12% and 23% under “high” and “low” capacity, respectively.
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4.3.2 Finite Capacity Case
To study the leadtime quotation decisions under limited capacity, we consider a single
server, where the service discipline is first-come-first-serve (FCFS). We assume that there
is an industry standard leadtime, `, which is acceptable to customers (as described in [24]).
That is, if the firm quotes a leadtime ` (or less), the customer places an order, and if the
quoted leadtime is larger than `, the customer leaves the system. Since a customer’s order
placement decision is the same for all leadtimes less than `, to avoid lateness penalties the
firm will never quote a leadtime strictly less than `. Hence, the firm’s decision is whether to
accept a customer (by quoting `) or to reject (by quoting longer than `). Industries might
have such fixed leadtimes if there is significant competition that has driven leadtime to a
common value, if leadtime is small compared to the known transportation time, or if there
is a batch process production. Retail firms may also have such fixed leadtimes, e.g., one
hour photo processing or thirty minute pizza delivery.
As in the case of infinite capacity, we study the leadtime quotation decisions of Naive
and Service-Sensitive firms. In the case of a Service-Sensitive firm, to compute the backlog
when a customer arrives to the system, one needs to keep track of the remaining time until
the due date for each customer (contrary to [69]), which makes the typical semi-Markov
decision process model intractable. Therefore, we consider a simplified discrete model,
where we set the length of a period to the industry dictated leadtime, `, and customers
arrive in batches at the beginning of each period. Let {Fs(k) : s ∈ S} be a collection of
stochastically increasing distribution functions where S = {smin, . . . , smax} denotes the set
of service levels. At the beginning of a period with service level s, dFs(k) is the probability
of having k customer arrivals. We assume k ≤ k̄, i.e., the number of arrivals in any period
is finite. The firm accepts a customers from this batch and the orders of the accepted
customers are due at the end of that period. Hence, the length of each decision epoch is
also `. In each period, the service of X(`) customers is completed. The firm pays a lateness
penalty of c for each customer where service is not completed at the end of the period, and
these customers are carried to the next period. Customer dissatisfaction can be generally
associated with worst-case performance as stated in Fleisch and Powell [31], therefore as a
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proxy for estimating the service performance in this complex system, we let the service level
change depending on whether the order of the last customer in the system was completed on
time. Since orders are completed during discrete intervals, the service level (s) goes up (s+)
if all the orders in a given period are completed before the end of the period, and goes down
(s−), otherwise. This model can be motivated by industries where orders can be placed
at any time, but the state of the system is assessed periodically (e.g., on a rolling horizon
basis) to update decisions. Discrete periods are desirable in any system where monitoring
costs are too high for continuous review, e.g., where production plans may be determined
daily or weekly.
4.3.2.1 Leadtime Decisions of the Naive Firm
The Naive firm believes that the arrival distribution of the customers is stationary through-
out time, and is independent of the performance in meeting the quoted leadtimes. Therefore,
it assumes that the arrival distribution F (k) is independent of the service level s and dF (k)
is the probability of having k arrivals in a given period.
We model this problem by a Markov decision process (MDP). The state of the system
is represented by i, where i is the number of orders in the system at the beginning of a time
period before the customers arrive. Let Vn(i) be the expected net benefit of the system over
periods n (n ≥ 0) to 0 and V0(i) be the expected reward to complete the service of the i
customers remaining in the last period of the horizon. Therefore, V0(i) = −[c·i+Eclearing(i)],
for i = 0, 1, ..., where,
Eclearing(i) =
Pr{X(`) = 0} · c · i + ∑ij=1 Pr{X(`) = j}[(i− j) · c + Eclearing(i− j)]
1− Pr{X(`) = 0} .








a ·R + Un(i + a)
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From (12), it is easily seen that if ∆Un(i) = Un(i)−Un(i + 1) is non-decreasing in i for any
n, or in other words if Un(i) is concave, and non-increasing in i, then we have the following
stationary policy for accepting customers:
a∗n(i) = arg max
a=0,...,M
{∆Un(i + a) ≤ R}.
Theorem 4.2. Vn(i) and Un(i) are concave and non-increasing in i for a fixed n, and the
optimal acceptance policy for the Naive model is in the form of a critical level policy.
From Theorem 4.2, there exists a critical accept-up-to policy (a∗n) that is independent of
the number of customers in the system. This policy is very easy-to-use: accept min{a∗n−i, k}
customers if there are i customers in the system.
4.3.2.2 Leadtime Decisions of the Service-Sensitive Firm
In this section, we consider the case where the firm considers customers’ sensitivity to the
service level (i.e., the firm’s past performance in meeting the quoted leadtimes). Similar to
the case of the Naive firm, we formulate the problem as a MDP. However, now the state of
the system is represented by (i, s), where i is the number of orders in the system, and s is
the service level at the beginning of the time period. Let Vn(i, s) be the maximal expected
net benefit of the system over periods n (n ≥ 0) to 0 and V0(i, s) be the expected reward to
complete the service of the i customers remaining in the last period of the horizon, which
is indicated as V0(i, ·) = −[c · i + Eclearing(i)] as before.








a ·R + Un(i + a, s)
}
dFs(k), with (13)






Vn−1(0, sup)I(X(`)≥i) + Vn−1((i−X(`))+, sdown)I(X(`)<i)
}
,
where sup = min{s + 1, smax} and sdown = max{s − 1, smin} are the system dynamics
equations, and I(·) is the indicator function.
Unlike the Naive firm, the order acceptance decisions of the Service-Sensitive firm depend
on the service level. Let a∗n,s(i) be the optimal accept-up-to level when there are i customers
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in the system and the current service level is s, when there are n periods to go until the
end of the horizon.
First, consider a given service level s. As the following example indicates, the optimal
policy for the accept-up-to level is not stationary as the number of customers in the system
changes.
Example 4.1. Consider a five-period decision horizon where the arrivals follow a Poisson
process and the maximum number of customers to arrive in a period is 10. We have 6
service levels S = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with the corresponding arrival rates {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25}.
The mean service rate is 5, and the lateness cost and revenue parameters are c = 1 and
R = 6, respectively. In this setting, the optimal accept-up-to decisions when the service level
is fixed at 0 are given in Table 6.
Table 6: Optimal accept-up-to level when the service level is 0
Number of customers
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 10 10 10 10 10 10
2 10 10 10 10 10 10
3 5 4 3 2 10 10
4 5 4 3 2 1 0
5 5 4 3 2 1 0
In Table 6, the optimal order acceptance decisions in period 3 indicates an optimal accept-
up-to level that neither increases nor decreases in the number of customers in the system.
Next, we look at how the optimal accept-up-to level changes as a function of the service
level for a given number of customers in the system.
Example 4.1. (Continued) The optimal accept-up-to decisions when there are six cus-
tomers in the system prior to the accept/reject decisions are given in Table 7.
As seen in Table 7, the optimal accept-up-to decisions are not necessarily monotonic (or
convex or concave) in the service level.
Example 4.1 indicates that it is difficult to find a general structured order acceptance
policy for the Service-Sensitive firm. Therefore, we consider a special case of this problem
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Table 7: Optimal accept-up-to level when there are six customers in the system
Service index
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 10 10 10 10 10 10
2 10 10 10 10 10 10
3 10 0 0 7 3 3
4 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
where the accepted orders are processed as batches and find that it has a nice structure,
which can then suggest policies that might work well for the more general case. Batch
processing would be applicable, for example, in chemical processing or the mass production
of semiconductor chips with silicon wafers in furnaces, where the processing can be applied
to many jobs without any negative effect on others. The optimal accept-up-to policy for
batch processing is given in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3. If service distribution is discretized uniform between [0,M] and no unethical
customer acceptance policy is utilized (never accept to increase number of customers over
M), and the firm’s service performance is modelled by 3 service levels, the optimal order
acceptance policy (a∗n(s)) in each period is a threshold policy, or an “accept-up-to” policy,
that depends on the current service level. When there are i customers in the system and the
service level is s, the optimal number of accepted customers is (a∗n(s) − i)+. The optimal
accept-up-to policy has a convex structure in the service level.
This policy is more complex than in the case without incorporating service, since it is
non-monotonic in the service level. However, for this special case, it helps to reduce the
search space for the best policy, and it also suggests a structure for a policy that might
work well in practice. We use the structured policy given in Theorem 4.3 as one heuristic




Since the general Service-Sensitive model with finite capacity has a complex optimal policy,
it may be difficult to solve for large instances. Thus, we have developed several heuristics
for the general problem that are more computationally efficient than solving to optimality.
The heuristics are briefly described below.
• Myopic Heuristic: The myopic heuristic incorporates service but only looks ahead
a small number of periods instead of solving the entire dynamic program optimally.
We implement and test this heuristic for varying number of periods in numerical
experiments and find the critical accept-up-to level for each service level.
• Marginal Cost/Benefit (MCB) Heuristic: In this heuristic we examine accepting one
more customer, where the estimated value accounts for the immediate revenue in-
crease but also the expected increase in penalty cost and impact of a potential service
decrease on the future. Given that i− 1 customers are already accepted, we estimate
the marginal value of accepting the ith customer at the current service index s by:
∆Π(i) =−Pr{X(`) < i− 1} · c + Pr{X(`) > i− 1} ·R
+ Pr{X(`) = i− 1}(R− c− 2αRβ(s))
The first and second terms of ∆Π(i) capture the case when the acceptance of the
ith customer does not change the future service level, and an extra cost or revenue
is obtained due to accepting this customer. The third term corresponds to the case
when the acceptance of customer i results in a drop in service, which causes the arrival
rate of future customers to decrease. Therefore the firm loses future expected revenue
of 2αRβ(s) in the next period, where β(s) is a parameter indicating the proportion of
lost revenue for each service level, therefore β ∈ [0, 1]. (If the service level is smin or
smax then we replace 2α with α because for those service levels there is a maximum
drop of one level.) Having β(s) depend on s ensures that the policies of the heuristic
depend on s just as the optimal policies do; it is also reasonable to expect that the
risk of losing future arrivals may be different for different service levels. We choose
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an increment and search over the best discrete values of β for each service level. The
set of β values that provide the highest expected profit is used to find accept-up-to
levels. If there are too many service levels, it may be time-consuming to search for β
for all of them. In that case, it is possible to reduce the search time by assuming that
β is the same for some service levels. For instance, it may be reasonable to assume
that for any s when λ(s) > µ + 2σ, the same β may apply.
• Convex Accept Levels (CAL) Heuristic: Since we know that the special case of batch
processing results in optimal decisions that are convex in the service levels, we search
specifically for convex policies for the general problem. While we do not have an
efficient way of identifying the very best convex policy, we use the following heuristic
for finding a high quality convex policy: Search for the best accept level for the first
service level and reduce the search afterwards to be convex around that initial value
and find the accept-up-to levels by this procedure for each period.
4.4 Numerical Experiments
4.4.1 Experiment Details
We perform numerical experiments to gain additional insights on the impact of the cus-
tomers’ sensitivity to the service performance. Recall that the Service-Sensitive firm uses a
policy that is optimal considering the customers’ sensitivity and obtains a profit of Π∗(L),
whereas the Naive firm uses a policy that is optimal for a constant customer arrival rate and
obtains a profit of Π(L). As a performance metric, we look at the percentage improvement
in profit from using the Service-Sensitive versus the Naive model, i.e. Π
∗(L)−Π(L)
Π(L) × 100.
We assume that both the arrival and the service processes are Poisson. The arrival rate
of the customers changes with the service level according to λ(s) = λ0 + α · s, where λ0 is
the base arrival rate and α is the sensitivity of the customers to the service performance
of the firm. We consider two cases for the arrival rate, which the Naive firm believes to
be constant: conservative and optimistic, where the Naive firm believes that the constant
arrival rate is equal to the mean and the maximum arrival rate, respectively. We assume
that at most 10 customers arrive at the beginning of each period to keep the problem size
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manageable while finding the optimal policy by dynamic programming techniques.
4.4.2 Results
Many companies use score cards with five levels (e.g., ranging from 0=below expectations
to 4=well above expectations) to evaluate their suppliers (see, for example Institute of
Chartered Accountants [75] and Samtec Inc., Supplier Quality Assurance Manual [78]).
Hence, for most of the experiments, we model the firm’s service performance by 5 service
levels, 0 indicating the lowest and 4 indicating the highest performance of the firm. Revenue
from a customer is 6 for all computations, and until otherwise stated we assume that the
mean service rate is 5 and the mean arrival rate changes from 1 to 9, which implies λ0 = 1
and α = 2 if there are 5 service levels.
Figure 9, shows how the percentage improvement in profit changes as the horizon length
increases when we solve both the Service-Sensitive and the Naive models optimally. At each
cost level, the percentage improvement decreases quickly in the first part of the horizon and
then stabilizes. The decrease at the beginning is largely due to the better performance of
the Service-Sensitive model in the vicinity of the terminal period. As seen in Figure 9, the
initialization effect becomes insignificant after 200 periods, therefore, we use 200 periods in


























































Figure 9: Percentage Improvement of Optimal over Naive with the Horizon Length
In Figure 10, we examine how the percentage improvement in profits from considering
service changes as the number of service levels increases. The percentage improvement
(i.e., the benefit of considering the customers’ service sensitivity) is higher when there are
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more service levels both for the conservative and the optimistic cases. The percentage
improvement is as high as 10% (8%) for the conservative (optimistic) case, which can be
explained by the fact that higher number of service levels allows the policy to control the


























































Figure 10: Percentage Improvement of Optimal over Naive with the Number of Service
Levels
Next, we look at the impact of capacity (i.e., mean service rate) on the percentage
improvement in profits. When the penalty cost is medium to high (Figure 11(b)), the
percentage improvement follows a concave structure, i.e., the improvement is small for tight
or abundant capacity, and large for medium capacity. Intuitively, when the capacity is
abundant, a high number of customers may be accepted and served on time, and there is
less difference between the decisions (and the profits) of the Naive and the Service-Sensitive
firms. Similarly, when the capacity is tight and the cost is not very small, both the Naive
and the Service-Sensitive firms accept fewer customers to avoid delay penalties. However,
when the capacity is medium, there is more room for error; in particular, by accepting a
higher number of customers than the Service-Sensitive firm, the Naive firm loses a significant
amount of future business. When the penalty cost is small (Figure 11(a)), we see that the
improvement first decreases in the mean service rate, and then follows a concave structure.
When the cost is small, the Naive firm tends to accept a significantly higher number of
customers, even for low capacity levels, since the revenues outweigh the penalty costs. This
leads to a significant loss of future business, resulting in a high difference between Service-
Sensitive and Naive profits. As the service rate slightly increases, the loss of future business
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decreases and hence, the profit difference also decreases. As the service rate increases
further, we see a similar concave structure in the percentage improvement of profits as in

























































(b) with Medium to High Penalty Costs
Figure 11: Percentage Improvement of Optimal over Naive with Service rate
In the results this far, we calculate the optimal policies and profits by dynamic pro-
gramming. As the number of periods increases, the solution time increases rapidly due to
the size of the problem. For large problems, efficient heuristics are needed to incorporate
the service performance into the leadtime and order acceptance decisions. We compare the
optimal policy and the heuristic policies that are mentioned in Section 4.3.2.3 to the Naive
case, for 200 periods and 5 service levels.
For the Myopic heuristic, we tried several horizon lengths (namely, 5, 10, and 15). We
found the marginal improvement of using 15 periods over 10 periods to be very small,
therefore we use 10 periods in our experiments. In our implementation, we determine the
best accept-up-to policy using the last periods of the dynamic program and apply this
stationary policy to all periods. In the Marginal Cost/Benefit heuristic, we consider a
constant β(s) if the arrival rate at service index s is within some predefined range (e.g.
(·, µ − σ), [µ − σ, µ + σ], (µ + σ, ·)) of the mean service rate µ. This approach reduces
the number of parameters to be considered (computed) in the heuristic. For the case of
5 service levels, we have three β(s) values which we estimate by running 100 repetitions
of a 200-period simulation over the all possible values of β using an 0.1 increment and by
looking at the average profit values. For the 200-period problem, the Marginal Cost/Benefit
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heuristic takes 10% of the time that the optimal dynamic program requires to find the
optimal decisions, and note that as the horizon gets longer the solution time of the heuristic
increases linearly whereas the solution time of the dynamic program increases exponentially.
In the Convex Accept Levels heuristic, the accept-up-to levels are found by the same
dynamic programming technique used to find the optimal policies for the Service-Sensitive
and Naive cases, only this time the policy is forced to be a threshold level which has a convex
structure in the service index. Although there is some improvement in the computation
time, the requirement of solving the entire dynamic program is still a concern in terms of
run time.
In general, we find that the Convex Accept Levels heuristic performs best, closely fol-
lowed by the Myopic and the Cost/Benefit Heuristics (they result in 97%, 96%, and 95% of
the optimal profits, respectively, for medium-high cost). The performance of the Marginal
Cost/Benefit Heuristic is slightly worse in our experiments, but its performance may be
improved by a better estimation of the β values, for instance, by using a different β for
every service level. It is also very encouraging that the behavior of the optimal and the



































































Recent examples of several companies emphasize the importance of leadtime performance
on the viability of the firm. The outcomes from ignoring service when quoting leadtimes or
accepting customers has ranged from the loss of millions of dollars paid in penalty costs,
the loss of customers due to the decrease in the reputation of the firm, and even to firms
going out of business (e.g., [43], [50] and eToys). Clearly when managing their customer
demand, a firm ignores service considerations at their peril.
In this chapter we consider leadtime and order acceptance decisions in a manufacturing
firm with stochastic arrivals and production processes, where a manufacturer considers past
service when making decisions. We assume that customers are aware of past service (such as
through internet tracking sites or by reputation), that a customer’s probability of placing
an order decreases with increasing leadtimes, and that past service determines the level
of future customer arrivals. A Service-Sensitive firm considers past performance in their
demand management policies, while a Naive firm ignores past performance in their policies;
both firms consider expected revenue as well as expected penalty costs due to late orders.
When there is infinite production capacity, the long-run service is the proportion of
orders completed on-time, and we assume that the processing times are exponential. This
allows us to find a closed-form expression for leadtime quotation. We show that the optimal
leadtime to quote that accounts for past performance is
• more conservative (i.e., longer) than the optimal leadtime that ignores it, and
• always positive, which means that a Service-Sensitive firm would never quote unethical
leadtimes.
This last result is important since it is possible that a Naive firm will quote unethical
leadtimes (i.e., leadtimes of zero) when the revenues are sufficiently high.
We also study demand management decisions when capacity is limited. In this case, we
assume that the leadtime is an industry-dictated standard, therefore considering whether or
not to accept a customer is equivalent to quoting a leadtime equal to the standard leadtime.
We also assume that decisions are made at discrete time intervals (e.g., due to high review
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costs), service is measured with discrete levels, and the proxy for service is whether all
orders were completed on-time in a given period.
For the general finite capacity model with a Service-Sensitive firm, we demonstrate that
there is not a structured acceptance policy with the number of customers or service levels,
even with Poisson arrivals and exponential service times. However, for the special case
where production is done in batches, we show that the optimal acceptance policy is of a
threshold type with the number of customers, and this policy is further convex in the service
levels. (The structure of this result also helps to inspire a heuristic for the more general
problem.) For the corresponding Naive model, we prove that a threshold acceptance policy
in the number of customers is optimal.
We develop several heuristics to solve the general Service-Sensitive problem when it is
computationally expensive to find the optimal solution using dynamic programming. The
heuristics perform within 95-97% of the optimal solution for medium-high lateness costs.
In our numerical experiments, we find that considering service where there is limited
capacity can have an impact of more than 2 − 6% in the profit over the Naive case. The
benefit from incorporating service is high when demand is close to the capacity, and having
a higher number of service levels tends to further increase the benefit compared to the Naive
case.
This chapter is the first work in the production and leadtime literature to incorporate
past performance on customers’ decisions; it has shown that service matters significantly
in leadtime quotation and demand management, and it is a starting point for many more
applications that can be considered in this area. Better service leads to higher customer
satisfaction, increases brand loyalty, and leads to higher profits for the firm.
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CHAPTER V
DYNAMIC SWITCHING TIMES FOR SEASON AND SINGLE
TICKETS IN SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT
5.1 Introduction
Revenue Management (RM) has made great strides in improving the bottom line of many
firms, especially in airlines (Smith et al. [70]), hotels (Lieberman [52]), and rental car
agencies (Geraghty and Johnson [37]), where RM is recognized as a key factor in the firm’s
viability and success. In these industries, there is often a limited or fixed capacity, and firms
are able to segment the market according to differing customer needs for particular prod-
ucts or services. Revenue Management is a set of tools to help mathematically determine
decisions such as the right prices or inventory to make available so as to maximize profit.
However, there are many other industries that offer a rich set of RM-type problems
that have not been fully addressed. One of these is the sports and entertainment (S&E)
industry, where tickets are sold in advance to an event at a venue such as a sports stadium
or theater. Like the airlines, the capacity for an event is generally fixed in advance, there
are high fixed costs to operate the venue and low marginal costs to selling additional tickets,
and the market can be segmented into different kinds of customers.
In S&E, one important segmentation of the market is that some customers buy season
packages, or bundles of tickets to events during the season, while others buy individual tick-
ets to performances. Season ticket holders are important to the success of the organization,
since they are more likely to donate to the organization, buy apparel, or renew tickets in
the future. They are also desirable customers since they commit to a bundle of tickets in
advance, which can offer greater cash flow to an organization or commitments upon which
to base future operational decisions. Most S&E firms offer season tickets first, and they
open purchasing for single tickets at a later date but before the start of the season. A basic
trade-off is that the firms want to capture as much of the demand for bundles of ticket,
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while still allowing enough time for individual ticket purchases when bundle demand will
not be sufficient to sell out the stadium, as it usually is not.
There are many interesting questions in Revenue Management in S&E. In this chapter,
we study the specific question of timing the switch from selling bundles to selling single
tickets. This is a problem motivated by our discussions with several large S&E firms,
where the timing of the sales, or in some cases, the timing of the promotion of sales to the
public is of key interest. The problem we study also is relevant to other industries where
revenue management applies. For instance, many hotels make accommodations for group
bookings for weddings or conferences, but the commitments must be made in advance and
the unsold rooms are released to the general public in advance of the travel date for bookings
by individuals. It is also possible to sell bundled capacity and smaller units of capacity in
industries such as manufacturing, where contracts may be negotiated with prioritized clients
for larger volumes of capacity.
A key aspect to the problem we study is that the bundled and single tickets are sharing
the same, limited capacity. In addition, after sales of single tickets are allowed, there may
be multiple events for sale simultaneously. These characteristics, along with the desire
to dynamically determine the timing decision when demand is stochastic, necessitated the
development of new models for the RM decision-making. Although the mathematics are
complex, we find that the structure of the problem leads to an optimal timing policy that is
relatively easy to understand and implement. The resulting policy defines a set of threshold
pairs of times and remaining inventory which determine the switch from bundles to single
ticket sales. After each bundle sale, if the current time is less than the corresponding
threshold, then the switch is made to selling individual tickets. We describe an algorithm
that will compute the threshold pairs, and we demonstrate the value of the dynamic timing
decision. We are able to generalize our results in several ways, including allowing the
demand rates for the bundles and single-tickets to depend on time.
In the next section we describe the relevant literature and identify our contribution.
In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we introduce the assumptions and the model, and present key
results for the base case. We generalize the model in Section 5.5, and we demonstrate some
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numerical examples in Section 5.6. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.7 and offer several
directions for promising research in RM in S&E.
5.2 Literature Review
In the airlines, revenue management research include how to determine the overbooking
levels for each fare-class (Littlewood [54] and Belobaba [6, 7]) and the bid-prices for each
leg of a network (Williamson [88] and Talluri and van Ryzin [79]); recent applications in
airline RM include Bertsimas and Popescu [8] and Karaesmen and Ryzin [45]. Unlike S&E,
the airline industry has a network structure where demand is for an origin and destination
pair, which may include multiple choices of paths for the consumer. When group purchases
are considered in the airlines, they are primarily for groups of individuals purchasing tickets
on one plane, rather than a single individual purchasing multiple tickets over time, and there
is very limited literature on group sales as stated in Yuen [89] and Farley [26]. The main
focus in airline RM is on determining prices or seat allocations, possibly across multiple
segments of customers, where customers purchase one ticket, rather than the timing of
bundles and single sales. The most similar sale to season tickets is the offering of “flexible
products”, where a single individual buys the option of two or more flights at a time and
assigned to one of them later by the carrier (Gallego and Phillips [34]).
There have been several papers in RM of airline and retail industries that focus on
pricing as a function of time. Gallego and van Ryzin [35] study pricing of a set stock
of products to be sold by a deadline and use intensity control to identify optimal prices
as a function of the stock level and remaining time. They also show the asymptotically
optimality of the policies with at most one price change as the volume of sales increase.
In the S&E industry, most organizations keep prices as announced throughout the selling
period, which is known as price stickiness in the entertainment industry (see Courty [16]).
Therefore pricing that are used in retailing are less applicable to the entertainment industry.
In the S&E, timing of different kinds of products is more common than timing of a price
change.
A closely related paper to our work is Feng and Gallego [29], which determines the
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optimal dynamic time to switch from one predetermined price to a second higher or lower
predetermined price so as to maximize revenue by selling a given stock over a finite time
horizon. Demand is assumed to be stochastic and demand rate is higher for the lower price,
and the optimal timing policy is shown to be a time threshold depending on the remaining
stock amount. The restrictions of one price change and time-invariant demand intensities
are relaxed in Feng and Gallego [28], and an efficient algorithm to find the optimal value
functions and the optimal pricing policy is provided. Like the latter papers, we use pre-
determined prices, but a main difference in our work is that we focus on switching sales from
bundles of tickets to single tickets. A second important factor in comparison to [29] and
follow-on papers is that when we switch to selling singles, the bundles split into multiple
simultaneous processes.
An initial version of the switching problem between bundles and singles is studied in
S&E in Drake et al. [22]. However, in that paper, they specifically focus on a static timing
decision, as is done in some organizations, where the switching date to single tickets is
announced in advance to the public. In this work, we study the dynamic switching time,
where the time may be determined by the sales-to-date. Although this complicates the
mathematics, it is important, since some organizations dynamically select their switching
or promotions times based on past demand. In [22], they assumed a linear Markovian death
process, but in this chapter we generalize the demand function to be any Poisson process,
so the techniques for analysis are quite different.
It is also important to point out that there has been analysis related to improving revenue
in S&E in other disciplines. A number of papers have looked at pricing decisions within
venue but did not consider bundling. For example, Leslie [51] and Rosen and Rosenfield
[66] studied revenue-maximizing ticket prices for different seat qualities but neither of these
studies considers the bundling of tickets. The most relevant work in the economics and
marketing literature that considers the selling of bundled commodities are: Venkatesh and
Mahajan [85], Venkatesh and Kamakura [84], McAfee et al. [56], Salinger [67] and Bakos
and Brynjolfsson [4], but these papers focus on the pricing of the bundles, not the timing
of decisions.
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5.3 Assumptions and Notation
Let M ∈ Z+ be the number of seats available for sale for each performance, and T ∈ R+
be the selling period. In the S&E data we have seen, season tickets are rarely bought
after the season begins, and the switch to selling singles is also made before the season
starts in every organization with whom we have worked. Thus, we focus on the selling
horizon before the season begins and assume that the selling period ends when the first
performance takes place. The selling period begins with first offering tickets as a bundle at
price pB and then switching to selling performance tickets individually at pi for performance
i, for i = 1, 2. We assume that these prices are predetermined at the beginning of the selling
season, which is true for most organizations, especially during the time preceding the start
of the season. Note organizations may have multiple classes but here we focus on the two
different products, with average price for each.
We assume that market segments (bundles and singles) are independent. This is sup-
ported by discussions with professional sports teams (Depaoli [20]), and it is also a common
assumption for many models in revenue management. We initially assume constant demand
rates with time for each of the bundled and single-ticket processes. In the second part of
the chapter, we extend the model and results to allow demand to depend on time. In the
extensions, the rates can also be used to proxy substitution among segments, by allowing
the demand rate for singles to be higher earlier in the season.
We assume that for each price, there is a corresponding Poisson process: NB(s), 0 ≤
s ≤ t, with known constant intensity λB for the bundled performances; N1(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
with known constant intensity λ1, and N2(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t, with known constant intensity λ2
for the two single performances, respectively. The state of the system is indicated by the
elapsed time t and the remaining inventory level at time t, n(t).
We define rB = λBpB and ri = λipi as the revenue rate from the bundled and individual
ticket sales of the single performances i = 1, 2, respectively. We assume that the expected
revenue rate for the bundle is higher than the sum of the expected revenue rates of the single
tickets, i.e., rB > r1 +r2. Otherwise, switching immediately would be optimal for all states,
and it is not relevant to study the optimal time to switch. This assumption can also be
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intuitively validated by the fact that the revenue for each bundle sale can include intangibles
such as donations to the organization (sometimes required for season ticket purchases) or
the value of early commitment and guaranteed revenues.
5.4 Model and Results
The expected revenue over [t, T ] is given by two expressions: Π(t, n(t)) and V (t, n(t)).
Π(t, n(t)) is the expected revenue when n(t) items are available for sale over [t, T ] while
tickets are sold individually (which means that the switch from bundles has already oc-
curred) and it is given by:
Π(t, n(t)) = p1E[(N1(T )−N1(t)) ∧ n(t)] + p2E[(N2(T )−N2(t)) ∧ n(t)],
where (x ∧ y) indicates the minimum of the two terms. V (t, n(t)) is the optimal expected
revenue over [t, T ], when n(t) items are available for sale over [t, T ] and τ is the best
switching time to individual ticket sales. It is represented by:











where T is the set of switching times τ satisfying t ≤ τ ≤ T and n(τ) = [n(t) − NB(τ) +
NB(t)]+, and x+ = max{0, x}.
At time t, if we can compare the expected revenue of switching immediately from selling
bundles to the expected revenue of delaying the switch to a time τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ), then we
can decide whether delaying the switch further than time t is beneficial or not. At the state
(t, n(t)) the expected revenue of switching at t is: Π(t, n(t)), and the expected revenue of





To compare these two expected values, we need a tool to measure the infinitesimal effect
of the delay. Let us define the infinitesimal generator G with respect to the Poisson process
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(t,NB(t)) for a uniformly bounded function g(t, n) as:


























(g(t + ∆t, n)− g(t, n)) + lim
∆t→0




+ λB[g(t, n− 1)− g(t, n)].
Applying G to the function Π(t, n(t)) gives the immediate loss of single ticket revenue
from delaying the switch from selling bundles to selling singles. Specifically, GΠ(t, n(t)) =
∂Π(t,n(t))
∂t + λB[Π(t, n(t)− 1)−Π(t, n(t))], which is composed of two parts: ∂Π(t,n(t))∂t , which
is the loss of revenue due to elapsed time, and λB[Π(t, n(t) − 1) − Π(t, n(t))], which is the
loss of revenue due to the decrease in inventory to be sold as singles. But during the time
when the switching is delayed, the Poisson process for bundles (t,NB(t)) is active, and it




= λBpB. Therefore, the net
marginal gain (or loss) for delaying the switch from bundles to singles at state (t, n(t)) is
given by:
GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB = ∂Π(t, n(t))
∂t
+ λB[Π(t, n(t)− 1)−Π(t, n(t))] + λBpB.
By Dynkin’s Lemma (Rogers and Williams [65]), we have the following two martingales















where 1{n(u)>0} is an indicator function. Since, the expected value of these martingales at
any time s is equal to their expected value at the starting time t, we have:













By the optional sampling theorem (Karatzas and Shreve [46]), we can replace s in (16) and
(17) with any stopping time τ ≥ t. Therefore, adding equations (16) and (17) for a stopping









[GΠ(u, n(u)) + λBpB1{n(u)>0}
]
du.
Note that the left-hand side of (18) is the expected revenue gained over Π(t, n(t)) by delaying
the switch from t to τ , and we can quantify it by using G, as shown in the right-hand side.







Taking the supremum of both sides in (18) over all stopping times t ≤ τ ≤ T , and
defining:





[GΠ(u, n(u)) + λBpB1{n(u)>0}
]
du, (19)
we get that V (t, n(t)) = Π(t, n(t)) + Ṽ (t, n(t)). This implies that the optimal revenue over
[t, T ] consists of two parts: the revenue from the immediate switch (selling single tickets
until the end of horizon) and the additional revenue from delaying the switch further in
time. Since Ṽ (t, n(t)) is also given by:






+ Π(τ, n(τ))]−Π(t, n(t)), (20)
it is obvious that Ṽ (t, n(t)) ≥ 0 for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M . In particular,
Ṽ (t, 0) = 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and Ṽ (T, n(t)) = 0 for all 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M . Moreover, equation
(20) indicates that when Ṽ (t, n(t)) = 0, delaying the switch further is not optimal, whereas
Ṽ (t, n(t)) > 0 implies a revenue potential from delaying the switch.
To compute Ṽ (t, n(t)), we introduce a function V (t, n(t)), which can be derived recur-
sively, and is identical to Ṽ (t, n(t)) when a number of conditions are satisfied. Obviously,
V (T, n(t)) = 0 and V (t, 0) = 0 must be in the list of conditions. Also, since Ṽ (t, n(t))
determines whether it is optimal to switch immediately or not, V (t, n(t)) must also imply
the switching decision. Formally,
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Theorem 5.1. Suppose there exists a function V (t, n(t)) such that V (t, n(t)) is continuous
and differentiable with right continuous derivatives in [0,T] for each fixed n(t). In addition,
if V (t, n(t)) satisfies:
(i) V (t, n(t)) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
(ii) V (T, n(t)) = 0 for 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M and V (t, 0) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
(iii) V (t, n(t)) = 0 ⇒ G(V + Π)(t, n(t)) + λBpB ≤ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
(iv) V (t, n(t)) > 0 ⇒ G(V + Π)(t, n(t)) + λBpB = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
then V (t, n(t)) = Ṽ (t, n(t)).
The proofs for Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 are essentially that of Feng and Xiao [30] and they
are provided in Appendix. V (t, n(t)) enables us to decide whether to delay the switch fur-
ther than t is beneficial or not. The net marginal gain from delaying, GΠ(t, n(t))+λBpB, is
the main term that defines the behavior of V (t, n(t)), and this term will be addressed
more closely in the following lemma. First, noting that E[(Ni(T ) − Ni(t)) ∧ n(t)] =
∑n(t)
k=1 P [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≥ k], we can express Π(t, n(t)) for n(t) ≥ 1 as:
Π(t, n(t)) = p1
n(t)∑
k=1
P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ k] + p2
n(t)∑
k=1
P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ k]. (21)
Lemma 5.1. The net marginal gain from delaying for 0 ≤ t ≤ T can be written as:
GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB = (rB − r1 − r2) + p1(λ1 − λB)P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]
+ p2(λ2 − λB)P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ n(t)].
See Appendix for details of the proof. Since λB > λi for i = 1, 2, clearly GΠ(t, n(t)) +
λBpB is increasing in t and n. Noting that GΠ(T, n(T )) + λBpB = rB − r1 − r2 when
n(T ) ≥ 1, we can conclude that GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB ≤ rB − r1 − r2.
If rB ≤ r1+r2, we have GΠ(t, n(t))+λBpB ≤ 0 for all (t, n(t)) which implies V (t, n(t)) =
0 for all (t, n(t)) too, because it satisfies the conditions at Theorem 5.1 (GΠ(t, n(t))+λBpB =
G(0 + Π(t, n(t)) + λBpB ≤ 0). This result validates the assumption that rB > r1 + r2 is
required for bundle sale option to be considered.
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Although we have demonstrated the existence of the alternate function V (t, n(t)), the
issue of how to calculate it for any (t, n(t)) pairs still remains. From condition (iv), we know
that GV (t, n(t)) = −GΠ(t, n(t)) − λBpB when V (t, n(t)) > 0. Applying the infinitesimal
generator G to V (t, n(t)), and multiplying both sides with e−λBt, we get:
∂V (t, n(t))
∂t
+ λB[V (t, n(t)− 1)− V (t, n(t))] + GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB = 0
∂V (t, n(t))
∂t
− λBV (t, n(t)) = −[λBV (t, n(t)− 1) + GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB]
∂[V (t, n(t))e−λBt]
∂t
= −[λBV (t, n(t)− 1) + GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB]e−λBt.
The last differential equation can be solved for V (t, n(t)), provided that V (t, n(t) − 1)
is known. Since V (t, 0) = 0, all V (t, n(t)) can be solved recursively. The formal procedure
is given in the following theorem. We will prove that the V (t, n(t)) that is determined
by the proposed recursive procedure satisfies conditions (i)-(iv), and is thus equivalent to
Ṽ (t, n(t)). Moreover this procedure also determines the latest switching times (xn(t)) for
each possible unsold inventory level n(t).
Theorem 5.2. For 1 ≤ n(t) ≤ M and λB > λi, for i = 1, 2, V (t, n(t)) can be recursively
determined by:












0 ≤ t ≤ T :
∫ T
t
L(s, n(t))e−λB(s−t)ds > 0
}
,
L(t, n(t)) = GΠ(t, n(t)) + λBpB + λBV (t, n(t)− 1), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
V (t, 0) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
What we have shown so far is, for any inventory level n = 1, . . . , M , there exists a time
xn such that: V (t, n) > 0 if t > xn and V (t, n) = 0 if t ≤ xn. Therefore, if the system
reaches the n remaining inventory level at a time t ≤ xn, then it is optimal to switch
immediately. On the other hand if it takes the system longer than xn time units to reach
the n remaining inventory level, then it is optimal to delay the switch. Therefore, xn’s can
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be interpreted as the latest switching time or the switching-time thresholds when n items
are unsold.
Moreover, we showed that these switching-time thresholds {xn}, n = 1, . . . , M are de-
creasing in unsold inventory n. Intuitively, as the unsold inventory increases, it is beneficial
for the team to delay the switch for more t values in order to get the advantage of the
bundle sales better.
This model captures the essential elements of the problem (i.e. bundling), while allowing
sales-to-date to influence the switching decision. The model we use is similar to the one in
Feng and Gallego [29], although a crucial feature of ours is that the initial selling period
is for the bundled items and after the switch there are two separate processes are active
for the individual performances. The limitations of the two-event season and the constant
arrival rates will be relaxed in the following section.
5.5 Extensions
The dynamic switching problem that is considered so far assumes constant demand rates
and a 2-performance selling season. In this section, we relax these two assumptions.
5.5.1 `-Performances (` > 2) During the Selling Period
When there are more than two performances on sale, the profit from the individual ticket









piP [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≥ k].
It is easy to see that when G is applied to Π(t, n(t)) we obtain:






pi(λi − λB)P [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≥ n(t)].
As before, we can define a function V which is equivalent to Ṽ as the one defined in Theorem
5.1, the same procedure in Theorem 5.2 is used to calculate it recursively.
Corollary 5.1. When λi ≤ λB for each i = 1, . . . , `, and rB >
∑̀
i=1
ri, the switching times
{xi} i = 1, . . . , M are decreasing in the remaining inventory.
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5.5.2 Time-Dependent Demand Rates
So far we have assumed that the Poisson processes associated with the pre-determined
prices have constant demand rates. But in general, the demand rates may change with
the remained time, such as they can decrease with time since demand may relate to seat
quality. Incorporation of time-dependent demand rates into the formulation will also enable
us to indirectly model other aspects such as substitution, where a decrease in the demand
rate can be considered to be caused by jockeying customers, or word-of-mouth effect, where
demand rates increase with time due to the increase in information about the performance.
We keep the problem setting same as in Section 5.4 and assume that for the Poisson
processes: NB(s) 0 ≤ s ≤ t has intensity λB(t), N1(s) 0 ≤ s ≤ t has intensity λ1(t), and
N2(s) 0 ≤ s ≤ t has intensity λ2(t). Defining rB(t) = λB(t)pB and ri(t) = λi(t)pi as the
expected revenue rate from the bundled and individual ticket sales of the two performances,
we can start our analysis.
To measure the infinitesimal effect of the delay in switching, let us define the infinitesimal
generator G with respect to the Poisson process (t,NB(t)) for a uniformly bounded function
g(t, n) as:






















+ λB(t)[g(t, n− 1)− g(t, n)].
Note that G is similar to G but incorporates the dependence of the demand rate on t.
Applying G to Π(t, n(t)), we get:
GΠ(t, n(t)) + λB(t)pB = [rB(t)− r1(t)− r2(t)] + p1(λ1(t)− λB(t))P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]




k=1 P [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≥ k]
∂t
= −λi(t)P [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≤ n(t)−1]. Now we are ready
to state the sufficient conditions for the function V which can be calculated recursively, and
is identical to Ṽ .
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Theorem 5.3. Suppose there exists a function V (t, n(t)) such that V (t, n(t)) is continuous
and differentiable with right continuous derivative in [0,T] for each fixed n(t). In addition,
if V (t, n(t)) satisfies:
(i) V (t, n(t)) ≥ 0, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
(ii) V (T, n(t)) = 0 for 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M and V (t, 0) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
(iii) V (t, n(t)) = 0 ⇒ G(V + Π)(t, n(t)) + rB(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
(iv) V (t, n(t)) > 0 ⇒ G(V + Π)(t, n(t)) + rB(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ M ;
then V (t, n(t)) = Ṽ (t, n(t)).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. The main difference is that the
demand rates are dependent on time rather than constants. The same procedure described
in Theorem 5.2 is used to calculate V (t, n(t)) recursively.
Corollary 5.2. When for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , λi(t) ≤ λB(t) for each i = 1, . . . , 2, and rB(t) >
r1(t) + r2(t), the switching times {xi} i = 1, . . . , M are decreasing in unsold items.
5.6 Computations
In this section, we present the computational analysis illustrating the connection between
the problem parameters and the optimal switching times. To calculate the optimal switching
times, we need to calculate the revenue potential from delaying the switch, V (t, n(t)), for
all inventory levels and times. After dividing the selling period into small time intervals
with the size of δ, we calculate V (t, n(t))’s recursively starting from V (T −δ, 1). The details
of the approximation using discrete time intervals (see also [27]) are given below:
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For any 1 ≤ n(t) ≤ M , and xn(t) < t < T with some δ > 0 such that t+ δ ≤ T , we have:


























[GΠ(u, n(t)) + λBpB + λBV (u, n(t)− 1)
]
e−λB(u−t)du
∼= V (t + δ, n(t))e−λBδ + (1− e−λBδ)pB + (1− e−λBδ)V (t, n(t)− 1)
+ (1− e−λBδ)[Π(t, n(t)− 1)−Π(t, n(t))] + e−λBδ[Π(t + δ, n(t))−Π(t, n(t))].
Therefore V (t, n(t)) can be estimated by:
V (t, n(t))∼= (V + Π)(t + δ, n(t))e−λBδ + (1− e−λBδ)[pB + (V + Π)(t, n(t)− 1)]−Π(t, n(t)).
If the selling horizon T is divided into K (large number of) intervals of length δ, we obtain
V (kδ, n(t))∼= (V + Π)((k + 1)δ, n(t))e−λBδ
+ (1− e−λBδ)[pB + (V + Π)(kδ, n(t)− 1)]−Π(kδ, n(t)).
Starting from the end of the selling horizon T , where V (T, ·) = 0, the following algorithm
guides computations from inventory level n = 1 to M .
Algorithm Let,
∆L(kδ, n(t)) = (V + Π)((k + 1)δ, n(t))e−λBδ
+ (1− e−λBδ)[pB + (V + Π)(kδ, n(t)− 1)]−Π(kδ, n(t)).
• Step 0: Initialize V (T, ·) = V (Kδ, ·) = 0 for all inventory levels. Set n(t) = 1 and
k = (K − 1).
• Step 1: Calculate ∆L(kδ, n(t)).
• Step 2: Set V (kδ, n(t)) = (∆L(kδ, n(t)))+ and k = k − 1.
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– if k 6= −1 and V (kδ, n(t)) ≥ 0, go to Step 1;
– otherwise set V (jδ, n(t)) = 0 for all j < k − 1 and n = n + 1.
Consider a team with a 150-ticket stadium facing the problem of selling tickets to one high-
demand and one low-demand game during a selling season that lasts 2 months. The demand
rates for the games are 50 and 40 seats per month and the prices to be charged to these
seats are $200 and $50 for high and low-demand games, respectively. If the seats are sold
as a bundle with one high and one low-demand seat, the demand rate will be 100 seats for
the bundle. Table 8 gives the calculated ten optimal switching times for the case when the
bundle is sold with a price of $220.
Table 8: Selected Optimal Switching Times when pB = 220
sales 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 64
remained seats (n(t)) 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
switch time (xn(t)) 0.191 0.168 0.145 0.123 0.1 0.078 0.055 0.032 0.01 0
As proved in Theorem 5.2, the optimal switching times are decreasing in unsold inventory
n. Let us consider the case when team has already sold 70 bundles (80 seats remain). In this
case the optimal switch time is given as 0.123 months. If the team sold the 70 items more
quickly than 0.123 months (t < x80), it is optimal to switch before the 71st sale arrives since
there is no expected revenue potential from delaying the switch further (V (t, 80) = 0). If
the team sold the 70th item in bundles after 0.123 months, then they should wait to switch.
To illustrate how the switch times are used, it is also beneficial to consider the case when
the optimal switch time is 0 with 86 seats leftover to sell in Table 8. Having zero switching
times until team sells 64 seats indicates the option of switching should be considered only
after the 64th sale.
Figure 13 shows the effect of different bundle prices on switching times. As the bundle
price increases, the optimal switch threshold decreases for each inventory level, which is
intuitive since the team tries to take advantage of high bundle prices by delaying the switch
to selling them as singles. If the bundle price is high enough, it may eliminate the switch
option altogether such as when pB = 260. Figure 13 also illustrates the strategy difference
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Figure 13: Optimal Switching Times at Different Bundle Prices
Another area of interest is the behavior of the switching thresholds with different demand
rates for the bundle. Keeping the prices and demand rates for the single games the same
as before, Figure 14(a) illustrates the optimal time thresholds when the bundle is priced
at $220 at different bundle rates. As expected, the time thresholds for switching at each
inventory level get smaller (i.e, the time window that requires switching gets smaller) with
the increasing demand rates for bundles, which enables the team to take advantage of the
high revenue from the bundle for a longer time.
Instead of looking the prices and rates separately, in Figure 14(b) we look at the effect
of rate of revenue (p · λ) for the singles. We consider the case when the rate of revenue
from bundles is 22000 with pB = $220 and λB = 100; the demand rates for the high and
low-demand games are again 50 and 40, respectively. For the singles, we keep the total
revenue rate r1 + r2 to be constant, so that the relative value of the bundles to the singles
does not change. We vary the relative rates of two single events, e.g., r1=9000 and r2=3000



































(b) Different Revenue Rates for Singles
Figure 14: Optimal Switching Times for Various Parameters
14(b) shows how the switching time thresholds affected with the change in relative rates
of the single events. The switching time thresholds get smaller as the revenue rate from
the low-demand events increases (from high-demand events decreases) among the total rate
of revenue from the singles. In other words, for a given inventory level, if the low-demand
event has higher revenue rate among the singles, team should switch later enabling the team
to take advantage of the revenue from the bundle for a longer time.
The final numerical experimentation is performed to see the impact on revenue of decid-
ing the switch time dynamically instead of using a static switch time. The model parameters
are the same as the ones that give the optimal switching times in Table 8. For a scenario,
we created 100 random sample paths for the arrival of bundled and single ticket customers,
and calculate the average revenue when the switch time is decided dynamically and stati-
cally for those paths. Figure 15 illustrates that the percentage revenue improvement over
the static case by the dynamic switching times changes between 1-2 % when the optimal
static switching time (i.e., 1.2) is selected. Another important observation is the reduction
in variation when dynamic switch times are used. The revenue values are calculated for the
same demand paths, therefore Figure 15 clearly illustrate that the usage of the dynamic
switching times improves the value and the predictability of the revenues that will be ob-
tained. Also note that the potential for improvement is higher by the usage of dynamic
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Figure 15: Comparison of Dynamic Decision of Switch Time vs Static
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have studied the problem of switching between selling bundles of tick-
ets to selling individual tickets so as to maximize revenue over a selling season. This is a
new problem in revenue management, which is motivated by discussions in the Sports and
Entertainment industries, but it may have applications in other industries also. Important
characteristics of the problem include that the bundle purchasers are sharing limited ca-
pacity with the single-ticket purchaser, and when the switch is made the bundle splits into
multiple simultaneous Poisson processes with demand for single tickets. We also focus on
the optimal dynamic switching time, where the switch time can depend on the state of the
system.
Although these characteristics make the problem complicated, we find that the structure
yields an optimal policy that is intuitive and easy-to-implement. The optimal time to switch
consists of a set of threshold pairs defined by the remaining inventory and the time left in
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the horizon. After each sale, the current time is compared to the time threshold for the
corresponding remaining inventory to determine if the switch should be made immediately
or not. The switching times balance the value of the bundle purchases over the single ticket
purchases as well as the probability of future demand arrivals of each. We also generalize
these results in several ways including to ` events in the horizon or to a demand rate that
depends on time, where the same structural results hold. We find that the value of dynamic
decision is 1 − 2% over the best static decision, which is comparable to improvements in
airline RM.
There are several areas of research to improve the dynamic switching problem. For
instance, it would be interesting to explicitly consider how the results change when there
are customer diversions between segments. It could also be useful to study how to set the
prices of the bundles and single tickets. Models can also be considered that include multiple
types of packages (such as full or half-season) in addition to the singles.
There are many useful and interesting research questions that can be analyzed in the
Sports and Entertainment industries as a whole. While some of these issues have been
studied in other industries, it would be useful to develop decision-making tools specific to
the characteristics of S&E, and some of the problems are specific to the S&E industries.
For example, some organizations allow consumers to make their own bundles; how should
the bundles be formed, how much gain is there from using high-demand events to drive
commitment to the bundle, what is the relative value of the increase in demand that may
occur with the decrease of commitment to less-popular events? How much would be gained
from dynamically adjusting prices in response to demand, and how should prices or inven-
tory of for different categories of seats be determined? These kinds of problems may require
OR tools, or OR integrated with economics or marketing. Revenue management in S&E
can help to improve the viability of large organizations such as pro-sports, which may face
large salary costs to remain competitive, to medium sized organizations (sports or theater),
which also struggle to balance costs and revenue, and even small organizations (community




In Chapters 2 and 3, we analyzed the demand management of multi-class customers via
stochastic inventory policies by a manufacturer with limited capacity. The customers are
segmented into classes based on service level or priority in Chapter 2 and on their acceptance
of delay fulfillment in Chapter 3. We showed that modified base-stock policies in the form
of (S, R, B) are optimal for both of the systems in these two chapters, where S is the
optimal order-up-to level, R denotes the optimal reserve-up-to levels, and B is the optimal
backlog-up-to levels.
These two chapters contribute to the literature on operational models to manage mar-
kets with segmented demand, and they show the impact of one kind of flexibility in the
production systems. Clearly, the analysis makes assumptions to simplify the problem such
as focusing on a single product and using predetermined prices. Yet, these simplifications
enabled us to find optimal policies that are easy to understand and implement. Additional
research would be helpful to advance the knowledge of how to manage systems with seg-
mented demand. For instance, pricing can be used to control the size of the customer classes
in the case of high variability.
In the current business environment, customers can easily share their experiences with
each other, informing their decisions about whether or not to do business with a firm or buy
that firm’s products. The delivery time of an item is not the only factor that affects the
customer’s decision, but customers may also consider the past performance of a producer.
Existing models of leadtime quotation or order acceptance did not capture the impact
of past performance on current decisions. In Chapter 4, we consider the optimal demand
management of a firm via leadtime quotation when the firm’s recent performance of meeting
quoted leadtimes impacts the future orders from the customers.
For the infinite capacity case, we find the optimal closed-form expression for leadtime
89
quotation. We show that the optimal leadtime to quote that accounts for past performance
is more conservative (i.e., longer) than the optimal leadtime that ignores it and is always
positive unlike the case that ignores service, which means that a firm considering past
performance effect would never quote unethical leadtimes. When capacity is finite and
leadtime is industry-dictated, we determine that the optimal demand acceptance policy
does not necessarily have a nice structure, but in some special cases it is convex in the
service level of the firm. We develop several heuristics for the general model including a
myopic heuristic and one based on balancing the marginal benefit of additional customers,
and they perform close to the optimal solution. In our numerical experiments, we find that
considering past performance where there is limited capacity can have an impact of more
than 2− 6% in the profit.
Clearly, the usage of the industry-dictated leadtime in the finite capacity case is a
limitation in the analysis, but considering that the optimal policy is not well-structured
even with this assumption suggests the difficulty of deciding the leadtime to quote. Our
research is the first work in the production and leadtime literature to incorporate past
performance on customers’ decisions; it has shown that service matters significantly in
leadtime quotation and demand management, and it is a starting point for many more
applications that can be considered in this area.
In the final part of the thesis (Chapter 5), we consider the problem of managing the
demand via dynamic timing of the switch between selling bundles of tickets to selling indi-
vidual tickets. Deciding the optimal time to stop selling season tickets is a new problem in
revenue management, which is motivated by discussions in the Sports and Entertainment
industries. The main characteristics that differentiate this problem from the ones already
studied in revenue management literature include that bundle purchasers are sharing lim-
ited capacity with the single-ticket purchaser, and when the switch is made the bundle splits
into multiple simultaneous Poisson processes with demand for single tickets. Further, we
focus on deciding the switch time dynamically.
We show that the optimal time to switch consists of a set of threshold pairs defined by
the remaining inventory and the time left in the horizon. After each sale, the current time
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is compared to the time threshold for the corresponding remaining inventory to determine
if the switch should be made immediately or not. The switching times balance the value
of the bundle purchases over the single ticket purchases as well as the probability of future
demand arrivals of each. We generalize these results in several ways including considering
more than 2 events in the horizon or to a demand rate that depends on time and find the
optimal switching times with a similar structure. We also perform numerical experiments
to see the effect of deciding the switch time dynamically (instead of using a static switch
time decided at the beginning of the selling horizon) on revenue.
There are several areas of research to improve the dynamic switching problem. For
instance, it would be interesting to explicitly consider how the results change when there
are customer diversions between segments. Offering multiple types of packages (such as
full or half-season) in addition to the singles or allowing the sale of bundles and singles
simultaneously after the switch are other possible areas of interest to pursue. S&E is a new
area of RM, so there may be many others as well.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Lemma A.1. Given g(x, y) is jointly concave in x and y, G(x) = max
y
g(x, y) is a concave
function for x.
Proof. For any x1, x2 ∈ R, let y1 = arg max{y|g(x1, y)}, y2 = arg max{y|g(x2, y)}. For any
λ ∈ [0, 1], let xλ = λx1 + (1− λ)x2, yλ = λy1 + (1− λ)y2. We have G(xλ) = max
y
g(xλ, y) ≥
g(xλ, yλ) ≥ λg(x1, y1) + (1− λ)g(x2, y2) = λG(x1) + (1− λ)G(x2).
Proof of Problem Simplification with Nesting for PDS (Lemma 2.1)
Proof. We will show this result by contradiction. Let us start with the first condition,
(B1t +B
2
t )·R1t = 0. Assume that there exists an optimal policy in the form of {(B1t +B2t ), R1t },
where (B1t + B
2
t ) · R1t > 0. We will show that there exists an alternate policy, which is at
least as good as and sometimes better than the “optimal” policy, which will contradict the
assumption of optimality of the policy where both the reserve inventory decisions and the
backlogged order decisions are positive. We consider two main market environments: 1)
when the current net revenue from selling out of inventory is better than the future expected
profit of an additional unit and 2) when the future expected profit of an additional unit is
better than the current net revenue from backlogging.
Case 1: Since the current net revenue from selling out of inventory is better than the
future marginal expected profit, the alternative policy is saving one less item in the current
period.
So the alternate policy is {B1t + B2t , R1t } = {B1t +B2t , R1t −1}. In both policies, decisions
for the second class (R2t and B
2
t ) are the same. But in the alternate policy, the values of
S2t and B
2,ef
t can be higher than the values of the assumed-optimal policy. Let Vt and V t
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be the expected profit starting from period t under the two policies, respectively. Let us
consider the following case:
• When D1t − St + R1t > B1t + B2t ⇒ B2,eft = B2,eft = 0 and S2t = S2t = 0
Vt = p1t (St −R1t + B1t + B2t )− htR1t − `1t (D1t − St + R1t −B1t −B2t )− β1t (B1t + B2t )
− `2t D2t + Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t )
V t = p1t (St −R1t + 1 + B1t + B2t )− ht(R1t − 1)− `1t (D1t − St + R1t − 1−B1t −B2t )
− β1t (B1t + B2t )− `2t D2t + Jt+1(R1t − 1−B1t −B2t )
= Vt + (p1t + `
1
t + ht)− (Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t )− Jt+1(R1t − 1−B1t −B2t )) > Vt
The last inequality follows from the fact that the current net revenue from selling out
of inventory is higher than the marginal expected profit from carrying one more unit
of inventory forward in this market environment.
Case 2: Since the future marginal expected profit is better than the current net revenue
from backlogging, promising one less item in the current period is the alternate policy.
So the alternate policy is {B1t + B2t , R1t } = {B1t +B2t −1, R1t }. In both policies, decisions
for the second class (R2t and B
2
t ) are the same. If we compare Vt and V t,
• When D1t − St −R1t ≥ B1t + B2t , we will have;
Vt = p1t (St −R1t + B1t + B2t )− htR1t − `1t (D1t − St + R1t −B1t −B2t )− `2t D2t
− β1t (B1t + B2t ) + Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t )
V t = p1t (St −R1t + B1t + B2t − 1)− htR1t − `1t (D1t − St + R1t −B1t −B2t + 1)− `2t D2t
− β1t (B1t + B2t − 1) + Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t + 1)
= Vt + (Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t + 1)− Jt+1(R1t −B1t −B2t ))− (p1t + `1t − β1t ) > Vt
The last inequality follows from the fact that the marginal future expected profit from
one more unit of inventory is higher than the current net revenue from backlogging in this
market environment.
For the second condition again assume that there exists an optimal policy in the form of
{B2t , (R1t +R2t )} where B2t ·(R1t +R2t ) > 0. We will show that there exists an alternate policy,
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which is at least as good as and sometimes better than the original policy. We consider the
same two main market environments as for the first condition.
Case 1: Since the current net revenue from selling out of inventory is better than the
future marginal expected profit, the alternative policy is saving one less item in the current
period.
So the alternate policy is {B2t , R1t + R2t } = {B2t , R1t +R2t −1}. In both policies, decisions
for the first class are the same, namely, the items saved from first-class customers are R1t ,
and the maximum amount of orders to backlog is B1t + B
2
t . Let us consider the following
case:
• When St −R1t −R2t ≥ D1t , D2t > S2t −R2t + B2t ⇒ B2,eft = B2,eft = B2t and S2t = S2t






t −R2t + B2t )− ht(R1t + R2t )− `2t (D2t − S2t + R2t −B2t )− β2t B2t
+ Jt+1(R1t + R
2
t −B2t )






t −R2t + 1 + B2t )− ht(R1t + R2t − 1)− `2t (D2t − S2t + R2t − 1−B2t )
− β2t B2t + Jt+1(R1t + R2t − 1−B2t )
= Vt + (p2t + ht + `
2
t )− (Jt+1(R1t + R2t −B2t )− Jt+1(R1t + R2t − 1−B2t )) > Vt
The last inequality follows from the fact that the current net revenue from selling out
of inventory is higher than the marginal future expected profit from one more unit of
inventory in this market environment.
Case 2: Since the future marginal expected profit is better than the current net revenue
from backlogging, promising one less item in the current period is the alternate policy.
So the alternate policy is {B2t , R1t + R2t } = {B2t − 1, R1t + R2t }. Again, in both policies,
decisions for the first class are the same, namely, the items saved from first-class customers




t . Let us consider the
following case:











t − ht(R1t + S2t )− `2t (D2t −B2t )− β2t B2t + Jt+1(S2t + R1t −B2t )






t − 1)− ht(R1t + S2t )− `2t (D2t −B2t + 1)− β2t (B2t − 1)
+ Jt+1(S2t + R
1
t −B2t + 1)
= Vt + (Jt+1(R1t + S
2
t −B2t + 1)− Jt+1(R1t + S2t −B2t ))− (p2t + `2t − β2t ) > Vt
The last inequality follows from the fact that the marginal future expected profit from
one more unit of inventory is higher than the current net revenue from backlogging in
this market environment.
For both of the conditions, the expected profit under the alternative policies is higher than
the policy we initially assumed to be optimal in both of the market environments defined
at the beginning of the proof, and it can be shown easily that in all other cases in the two
market environments, the alternate policies produce exactly the same or higher expected
profit as the starting policy. Since alternate policies are at least as good as and sometimes
better than the starting policy, a contradiction has been reached.
Proof of Concavity for the Priority Differentiation Strategy (Theorem 2.1)
Proof. Let jt(It, St) = −ct(St − It) + Gt(St), so Jt(It) = max
St:It≤St≤It+qt
jt(It, St). We prove
by induction.
1. For last period:


































0 v.(ST − k)dΦ1,2T (k)
Where v is the salvage value per item at the end of the horizon: p1T > p
2
T > v > 0
It is clear that the first derivative of GT is equal to:





















Now we can check whether G′T (ST ) is non-increasing or not:




T − p1T ) + φ1,2T (ST ).(v − p2T )
Since p1T > p
2
T > v > 0, it is easily seen that G
′′
T (ST ) ≤ 0, therefore GT (ST ) is concave.
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2. Given t + 1 ≤ T , assume that Gt+1(ST ) is concave in ST , then we can prove that
jt+1(It+1, St+1) is jointly concave in It+1 and St+1 by the following.
For any (I1, S1), (I2, S2) ∈ <2, let Iλ = λI1 + (1− λ)I2, Sλ = λS1 + (1− λ)S2. Then,
jt+1(Iλ, Sλ) = −ct+1(Sλ − Iλ) + Gt+1(Sλ)
= −ct+1(λS1 + (1− λ)S2 − λI1 − (1− λ)I2) + Gt+1(λS1 + (1− λ)S2)
≥ −λct+1(S1 − I1)− (1− λ)ct+1(S2 − I2) + λGt+1(S1) + (1− λ)Gt+1(S2)
= λjt+1(I1, S1) + (1− λ)jt+1(I2, S2).
So by Lemma A.1, Jt+1(It) is concave in It, and as a result J ′t+1(It) is non-increasing
in It.







































































t = max{I : p1t + `1t + ht ≤ J
′
t+1(I)} if p1t + `1t + ht < J
′





t = max{I : p2t + `2t + ht ≤ J
′
t+1(I)} if p2t + `2t + ht < J
′
t+1(0) (= 0 o.w.).
Thus, we have ∇g1t (St, R1t , R2t ) ≥ [0, 0]T when 0 ≤ R1t ≤ R1
∗
t and 0 ≤ R2t ≤ R2
∗
t ,



















t ) is the unique unconstrained



















t ), for 0 ≤ R1t ≤ (St)+ and
0 ≤ R2t ≤ (St)+.



































































t = min{I : J
′
t+1(−I) ≥ p1t + `1t − β1t } if p1t + `1t − β1t > J
′
t+1(0) (= 0 o.w.)
B2
∗
t = min{I : J
′
t+1(−I) ≥ p2t + `2t − β2t } if p2t + `2t − β2t > J
′
t+1(0) (= 0 o.w.).
Thus, we have ∇g2t (St, B1t , B2t ) ≥ [0, 0]T when 0 ≤ B1t ≤ B1
∗
t and 0 ≤ B2t ≤ B2
∗
t ,



















t ) is the unique unconstrained











t , qt+1), min(B
2∗






t ), for 0 ≤ B1t ≤ qt+1 and
0 ≤ B2t ≤ qt+1.














































t − β1t )− J ′t+1(−B1t )
]
dΦ1t (k)







t = max{I : p2t + `2t + ht ≤ J
′
t+1(I)} if p2t + `2t + ht < J
′
t+1(0) (= 0 o.w.)
B1
∗
t = min{I : J
′
t+1(−I) ≥ p1t + `1t − β1t } if p1t + `1t − β1t > J
′
t+1(0) (= 0 o.w.).
Thus, we have ∇g3t (St, R2t , B1t ) ≥ [0, 0]T when 0 ≤ R2t ≤ R2
∗
t and 0 ≤ B1t ≤ B1
∗
t ,



















t ) is the unique unconstrained



















t ), for 0 ≤ R2t ≤ (St)+ and 0 ≤
B1t ≤ qt+1.
6. Let us prove the concavity of G1t (St) with respect to St, where G
1







We will consider G1t (St) in five cases:
Case I: St ≤ R1∗t













t (k), so its first derivative is G
1′
t (St) = −ht+J ′t+1(St). Thus,
it is clear that G1
′
t (St) is non-increasing since: G
1′′





































Thus, it is clear that G1
′













t )− (p1t + ht + `1t ));
also, J ′′t+1(St) ≤ 0, and p1t + ht + `1t = J ′t+1(R1
∗
t ) due to the R
1∗
t decisions.
Case III: St = R1
∗
t + ε
It is clear that G1
′












t + ε)− J ′t+1(R1
∗
t ));
also, J ′t+1(St) is non-increasing and p
1











t + ε < St




























































( ∫ St−R1∗t −R2∗t −k1
0 J
′

















The second derivative is:
G1
′′








t + ht + `
2

























( ∫ St−R1∗t −R2∗t −k1
0 (J
′′













t )− (p1t + ht + `1t )).
Thus, it is clear that G1
′
t (St) is non-increasing since J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0, p1t + ht + `1t =
J ′t+1(R
1∗
t ) due to the R
1∗






t ) = p
2
t + ht + `
2











t + ε = St
In this case, the second derivative is:
G1
′′
t (St) = φ
1





































t − k))dΦ1t (k).
It is clear that G1
′
t (St) is non-increasing in this case since J
′
t+1(St) is non-increasing,






t ) due to the R
1∗




t ) = p
2
t + ht + `
2
t





7. Let us prove the concavity of G2t (St) with respect to St, where G
2





































































































The second derivative is:
G2
′′
t (St) = φ
1















t+1(St − k)dΦTt (k) + φ1t (St)(β2t − β1t )






t − β2t − J ′t+1(−B2
∗
t ))












J ′′t+1(St − k)dΦ1t (k).
Thus, it is clear that G2
′
t (St) is non-increasing since J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0; p2t + `2t − β2t =
J ′t+1(−B2
∗















t decision, and β
1
t ≥ β2t .
8. Let us prove the concavity of G3t (St) with respect to St, where G
3







We will consider G3t (St) in three cases:
Case I: St ≤ R2∗t




































t (St) = φ
1











t+1(St − k)dΦ1t (k).
Thus, it is clear that G3
′
t (St) is non-increasing since J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0 and p1t + `1t − β1t =
J ′t+1(−B1
∗





t + ε < St




























































( ∫ St−R2∗t −k1
0 J
′























t + ht + `
2
t − J ′t+1(R2
∗
t ))















t − k1)(J ′t+1(R2
∗






( ∫ St−R2∗t −k1
0 J
′′





J ′′t+1(St − k)dΦ1t (k)− (ht + β1t )φ1t (St).
Thus, it is clear that G3
′
t (St) is non-increasing since: J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0; p1t + `1t − β1t =
J ′t+1(−B1
∗
t ) due to the B
1∗
t decision, and p
2












t + ε = St and B
1∗
t ≤ qt+1
The second derivative of G3t (St) is:
G3
′′
t (St) = φ
1
t (0)(1− φ2t (0))(p2t + ht + `2t − J ′t+1(R2
∗











t )− (p1t + `1t − β1t ))
+(J ′t+1(R
2∗















t + ε− k)− J ′t+1(R2
∗
t − k))dΦ1t (k).
We know that G3
′






t − β1t = J ′t+1(−B1
∗
t ) due to the B
1∗
t decision, and p
2










9. Let us prove the concavity of Gt(St).
In each period, we must be in one of the following cases, which are independent of the
St values:




t + ht, we have R
1∗
t ≥ 0, R2
∗
t ≥ 0, B1
∗
t = 0, and B
2∗
t = 0,
therefore R1,ct ≥ 0, R2,ct ≥ 0, B1,ct = 0, and B2,ct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) =
G1t (St).
– If p2t + `
2
t − β2t > J ′t+1(0), we have B1
∗
t ≥ 0, B2
∗
t ≥ 0, R1
∗
t = 0, and R
2∗
t = 0,
therefore B1,ct ≥ 0, B2,ct ≥ 0, R1,ct = 0, and R2,ct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) =
G2t (St).








t − β1t + `1t , we have R2
∗





t ≥ 0, and B2
∗
t = 0, therefore R
1,c
t = 0, R
2,c
t ≥ 0, B1,ct ≥ 0, and B2,ct = 0; thus,
we have Gt(St) = G3t (St).




PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. We will show this result by contradiction. Assume that there exists an optimal policy
in the form of {Bt, (R1t + R2t )} where Bt · (R1t + R2t ) > 0 . We will show that there exists an
alternate policy that is at least as good as and sometimes better than the assumed optimal
policy, which will contradict the optimality of the assumed policy where both the reserve
inventory decisions and the backlogging availability decision are positive. We consider two
main market environments: 1) when the current net revenue from selling out of inventory
is better than the future expected profit of an additional unit and 2) when the future profit
of an additional unit is better than the current net revenue from backlogging.
Case 1: Since the current net revenue from selling out of inventory is better than the
future expected profit of an additional unit, the alternative policy is saving one item less in
the current period.
So the alternate policy is; {Bt, R1t + R2t } = {Bt, R1t + R2t − 1}. In both policies, The
decision for the first class is the same, namely, the items saved from first class customers
is R1t . Let Vt and Vt be the expected profit starting from period t under the two policies,
respectively. Let us consider two cases:
• Case 1.1: S2t ≥ R2t , S2t − R2t < D2t ≤ S2t − R2t + Bt ⇒ S2t > R2t , S2t − R2t ≤ D2t <
S2t −R2t + Bt






t − htR2t − htR1t − β2t (D2t − S2t + R2t ) + JTDSt+1 (R1t + S2t −D2t )











t −D2t ) = Vt + ht + β2t > Vt
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• Case 1.2: S2t ≥ R2t , D2t > S2t −R2t + Bt ⇒ S2t > R2t , D2t ≥ S2t −R2t + Bt


















t −R2t + 1 + Bt)− ht(R2t − 1)− h1t R1t − `2t (D2t − S2t + R2t − 1−Bt)
− β2t Bt + JTDSt+1 (R1t + R2t −Bt − 1)
= Vt + (p2t + ht + `
2
t )− [JTDSt+1 (R1t + R2t −Bt)− JTDSt+1 (R1t + R2t −Bt − 1)] > Vt
The last inequality follows from the fact that the current net revenue from selling
out of inventory is better than the future expected profit of an additional unit in this
market setting.
Case 2: Since the future profit of an additional unit is better than the current net
revenue from backlogging, promising one item less in the current period is the alternate
policy.
So the alternate policy is; {Bt, R1t + R2t } = {Bt − 1, R1t + R2t }. Again, in both policies,
R1t decision for the first class is same. Let us compare Vt and Vt under the following three
cases:
• Case 2.1: D1t ≥ St −R1t and D2t ≥ Bt ⇒ D2t > Bt




Vt = p1t (St −R1t ) + p2t (Bt − 1)− htR1t − `1t (D1t − St + R1t )− `2t (D2t −Bt + 1)
− β2t (Bt − 1) + JTDSt+1 (R1t −Bt + 1)
= Vt + [JTDSt+1 (R
1
t −Bt + 1)− JTDSt+1 (R1t −Bt)]− (p2t + `2t − β2t ) > Vt
• Case 2.2: St −R1t > D1t > St −R1t −R2t and D2t ≥ Bt ⇒ D2t > Bt




t Bt − htS2t − htR1t − `2t (D2t −Bt)− β2t Bt + JTDSt+1 (S2t + R1t −Bt)









t −Bt + 1)




t −Bt + 1)− JTDSt+1 (S2t + R1t −Bt)]− (p2t + `2t − β2t ) > Vt
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• Case 2.3: S2t ≥ R2t , D2t ≥ S2t −R2t + Bt ⇒ S2t ≥ R2t , D2t > S2t −R2t + Bt


















t −R2t + Bt − 1)− htR2t − htR1t − `2t (D2t − S2t + R2t −Bt + 1)
− β2t (Bt − 1) + JTDSt+1 (R1t + R2t −Bt + 1)




t −Bt + 1)− JTDSt+1 (R1t + R2t −Bt)]− (p2t + `2t − β2t ) > Vt
The last inequalities in all three of the cases follows from the fact that the future
profit of an additional unit is better than the current net revenue from backlogging in
this market setting.
The expected profit under the alternative policies is higher than the policy we initially
assumed to be optimal in both of the market environments defined at the beginning of the
proof, and it can be shown easily that in all other cases in the two market environments,
the alternate policies produce exactly the same expected profit. Since alternate policies are
at least as good as and sometimes better than the starting policy, a contradiction has been
reached.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there is an optimal policy with Rt · Bt > 0 for some
period t. Let Rt = Rt − 1 and Bt = Bt − 1 be the alternative policy, and let Vt and Vt be
the expected profit starting from period t under the two policies respectively. We compare
the two policies in the following three cases:
• Case 1: D1,2t ≤ St −Rt, hence D1,2t < St −Rt.
Vt = p2t D
1,2
t − ht(St −D1,2t ) + JCSSt+1 (St −D1,2t ) = Vt
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• Case 2: St −Rt + Bt/αt > D1,2t > St −Rt, hence St −Rt + Bt/αt ≥ D1,2t ≥ St −Rt.
Vt = p2t (St −Rt + bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt)c)− htRt − β2t bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt)c
−`1t d(1− αt)(D1,2t − St + Rt)e+ JCSSt+1 (Rt − bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt)c)
Vt = p2t (St −Rt + 1 + bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt − 1)c)− ht(Rt − 1)
−β2t bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt − 1)c − `1t d(1− αt)(D1,2t − St + Rt − 1)e
+JCSSt+1 (Rt − 1− bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt − 1)c)
If bαt(D1,2t −St +Rt−1)c=bαt(D1,2t −St +Rt)c, then d(1−αt)(D1,2t −St +Rt−1)e =
d(1− αt)(D1,2t − St + Rt)e − 1. We have,
Vt = Vt+p2t +ht+`
1
t−JCSSt+1 (Rt−bαt(D1,2t −St+Rt)c)+JCSSt+1 (Rt−1−bαt(D1,2t −St+Rt)c)
Since D1,2t < St−Rt+Bt/αt, a new demand from class 2 will be accepted, which means




t+1 (Rt− 1−bαt(D1,2t −St +Rt)c) ≥ JCSSt+1 (Rt−bαt(D1,2t −St +Rt)c).
Thus Vt ≥ Vt.
Otherwise, bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt − 1)c=bαt(D1,2t − St + Rt)c-1, then d(1 − αt)(D1,2t −
St + Rt − 1)e = d(1− αt)(D1,2t − St + Rt)e. We have, Vt = Vt + ht + β2t ≥ Vt.
• Case 3: D1,2t ≥ St −Rt + Bt/αt, hence D1,2t > St −Rt + Bt/αt.
Vt = p2t (St −Rt + Bt)− htRt − β2t Bt − `1t (1− αt)Bt/αt − `t(D1,2t − St + Rt −Bt/αt)
+JCSSt+1 (Rt −Bt)
Vt = Vt + ht + β2t + (1− αt)(`1t − `2t ) ≥ Vt
The expected profit under the alternative policy is always greater or equal to that under
the current policy, which incurs a contradiction.
Proof of Concavity Results (Theorem 3.1)
Lemma B.1. Given g(x, y) is jointly concave in x and y, G(x) = max
y
g(x, y) is a concave
function for x.
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Proof. For any x1, x2 ∈ R, let y1 = arg max{y|g(x1, y)}, y2 = arg max{y|g(x2, y)}. For any
λ ∈ [0, 1], let xλ = λx1 + (1− λ)x2, yλ = λy1 + (1− λ)y2. We have G(xλ) = max
y
g(xλ, y) ≥
g(xλ, yλ) ≥ λg(x1, y1) + (1− λ)g(x2, y2) = λG(x1) + (1− λ)G(x2).
For the Time Differentiation Strategy
In the proof below, the TDS superscript is omitted from the expected profit functions
to increase readability.
Proof. Let jt(It, St) = −ct(St − It) + Gt(St), so Jt(It) = max
St:It≤St≤It+qt
jt(It, St). We prove
by induction.
1. For period t = T , we have BT = 0 , R1T = R
2
T = 0, and JT+1(IT ) = v · IT .













T , [ST −D1T ]+)dΦ1T (D1T )dΦ2T (D2T )
+
∫∫



































0 v.(ST − k)dΦ1,2T (k)
Where v is the salvage value per item at the end of the horizon: p1T > p
2
T > v > 0
It is clear that its first derivative is equal to:





















Know we can check whether G′T (ST ) is non-increasing or not:




T − p1T ) + φ1,2T (ST ).(v − p2T )
Since p1T > p
2
T > v > 0, it is easily seen that G
′′
T (ST ) ≤ 0, therefore GT (ST ) is concave.
2. Given t + 1 ≤ T , assume that Gt+1(St) is concave in St, then we can prove that
jt+1(It+1, Yt+1) is jointly concave in It+1 and Yt+1 by the following.
For any (I1, Y1), (I2, Y2) ∈ <2, let Iλ = λI1 + (1− λ)I2, Yλ = λY1 + (1− λ)Y2. Then,
jt+1(Iλ, Yλ) = −ct+1(Yλ − Iλ) + Gt+1(Yλ)
= −ct+1(λY1 + (1− λ)Y2 − λI1 − (1− λ)I2) + Gt+1(λY1 + (1− λ)Y2)
≥ −λct+1(Y1 − I1)− (1− λ)ct+1(Y2 − I2) + λGt+1(Y1) + (1− λ)Gt+1(Y2)
= λjt+1(I1, Y1) + (1− λ)jt+1(I2, Y2).
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So by Lemma B.1, Jt+1(It) is concave in It, and as a result J ′t+1(It) is non-increasing
in It.











































































max{I : p1t + `1t + ht ≤ J
′












max{I : p2t + `2t + ht ≤ J
′




Thus we have ∇gTDSt (St, R1t , R2t , 0) ≥ [0, 0]T when 0 ≤ R1t ≤ R1
∗























t ) is the unique unconstrained op-



















t , 0), for 0 ≤ R1t ≤ (St)+
and 0 ≤ R2t ≤ (St)+.
4. Next let us prove that gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt) is quasi-concave in Bt .










































Thus we have g
′TDS
t (St, 0, 0, Bt) ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ Bt ≤ B∗t , and g
′TDS
t (St, 0, 0, Bt) ≤ 0
when Bt > B∗t ; thus, gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt) is quasi-concave with respect to Bt. B∗t is the
unique unconstrained optimizer of gTDSt (St, 0, 0, Bt) and it is independent of inventory
level St. Bct = min(B
∗
t , qt+1) maximizes g
TDS
t (St, 0, 0, Bt), for 0 ≤ Bt ≤ qt+1.
5. Let us prove the concavity of GRt (St) with respect to St, where






t , 0). We will consider G
R
t (St) in five cases:
Case I: St ≤ R1∗t












t (k), so its first derivative is G
R′
t (St) = −ht+J ′t+1(St). Thus
it is clear that GR
′
t (St) is non-increasing since: G
R′′



































t − k)htdΦ1t (k) +
∫ St−R1∗t














































Thus it is clear that GR
′













t )− (p1t + ht + `1t ));
also, J ′′t+1(St) ≤ 0, and p1t + ht + `1t = J ′t+1(R1
∗
t ) due to the R
1∗
t decisions.
Case III: St = R1
∗
t + ε
Now it is clear that GR
′




























t (k)− J ′t+1(R1
∗
t ) + ht







t + ε)− J ′t+1(R1
∗
t ));
also, J ′t+1(St) is non-increasing and p
1











t + ε < St
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( ∫ St−R1∗t −R2∗t −k1



































































































































( ∫ St−R1∗t −R2∗t −k1
0 J
′

















The second derivative is:
GR
′′








t + ht + `
2

























( ∫ St−R1∗t −R2∗t −k1
0 (J
′′













t )− (p1t + ht + `1t )).
Thus it is clear that GR
′
t (St) is non-increasing since J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0, p1t + ht + `1t =
J ′t+1(R
1∗
t ) due to the R
1∗






t ) = (p
2
t + ht + `
2








t + ε = St














































































































































t − k))dΦ1t (k).
It is clear that GR
′
t (St) is non-increasing in this case since J
′
t+1(St) is non-increasing,






t ) due to the R
1∗




t ) = p
2
t + ht + `
2
t
due to the R2
∗
t decision.
6. Let us prove the concavity of GBt (St) with respect to St, where
GBt (St) = g
TDS
t (St, 0, 0, B
c
t ). We will consider G
B
t (St) in two cases:
Case I: B∗t ≤ qt+1






























t+1(St − k1 − k2)dΦ2t (k2)
)




























t+1(St − k)dΦ1,2t (k).
The second derivative is:
GB
′′
t (St) = (J
′




t (St + B
∗
t − k1)dΦ1t (k1)





t (k)− htφ1,2t (St)




































t+1(St − k1 − k2)dΦ2t (k2).








t (St + B
∗































t (St + B
∗





t(−k)− (p2t + `2t − β2t ))dΦ2t (k)− (ht + β2t )φ1,2t (St) ≤ 0
Since p2t + `
2
t − β2t = J ′t+1(−B∗t ), and p2t + `2t − β2t > J ′t+1(−k) where k ∈ [0, B∗t ) due
to the B∗t decision.
Case II: B∗t > qt+1
Replacing B∗t by qt+1 in case 1 and noting that p2t + `2t − β2t > J ′t+1(−qt+1) is enough
to conclude that GBt (St) is also concave in this case.
7. Let us prove the concavity of Gt(St).
In each period, we must be in one of the following cases, which are independent of the
St values:
– If p2t + `
2
t + ht ≥ J ′t+1(0) ≥ p2t + `2t − β2t , we have R1
∗
t = 0, R
2∗
t = 0, and B
∗
t = 0
, therefore R1,ct = 0, R
2,c
t = 0 and B
c








t + ht we have R
1∗
t ≥ 0, R2∗t ≥ 0, and B∗t = 0, therefore
R1,ct ≥ 0, R2,ct ≥ 0 and Bct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) = GRt (St).
– If p2t + `
2
t − β2t > J ′t+1(0) we have B∗t ≥ 0, R1
∗
t = 0, and R
2∗
t = 0, therefore
Bct ≥ 0, R1,ct = 0, and R2,ct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) = GBt (St).
We see that in each period, Gt(St) reduces to some function that is proved to be
concave. Therefore Gt(St) is concave.
For the Common Service Strategy
In the proof below, the CSS superscript is omitted from the expected profit functions
to increase readability.
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Proof. Let jt(It, St) = −ct(St − It) + Gt(St), so Jt(It) = max
St:It≤St≤It+qt
jt(It, St). We prove
by induction.
1. For period t = T , we have BT = 0 , RT = 0 and JT+1(IT ) = v · IT .
GT (ST ) is concave in ST , since G′T (ST ) is non-increasing in ST :
G′′T (ST ) = (v − hT − p2T − `T )φ1,2T (St) ≤ 0, since v < p2T .
2. Given t+1 ≤ T , assume that Gt+1(St+1) is concave in St+1, then it is easy to see that
jt+1(It+1, St+1) is jointly concave in It+1 and St+1. So by Lemma B.1, Jt+1(It+1) is
concave in It+1, and as a result J ′t+1(It+1) is non-increasing in It+1.
3. Next let us prove that gCSSt (St, Rt, 0) is quasi-concave in Rt. We have,
∂gCSSt (St, Rt, 0)
∂Rt
= (−p2t − `t − ht + J
′
t+1(Rt))(1− Φ1,2t (St −Rt)) if St ≥ Rt(= 0 o.w.)
If R∗t is defined as in (9), we have g
′CSS
t (St, Rt, 0) ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ Rt ≤ R∗t , and
g
′CSS
t (St, Rt, 0) ≤ 0 when Rt > R∗t ; thus, gCSSt (St, Rt, 0) is quasi-concave with re-
spect to Rt. R∗t is the unique unconstrained optimizer of gCSSt (St, Rt, 0), and it is
independent of inventory level St. Rct = min(R
∗
t , St) maximizes g
CSS
t (St, Rt, 0), for
0 ≤ Rt ≤ (St)+.
4. Next let us prove that gCSSt (St, 0, Bt) is quasi-concave in Bt. Taking the derivative,





[p2t − β2t + `2t − J ′t+1(−Bt)]dΦ1,2t (D1,2t ).
Let us define B∗t as in (9), then we have g
′CSS
t (St, 0, Bt) ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ Bt ≤ B∗t ,
and g
′CSS
t (St, 0, Bt) ≤ 0 when Bt > B∗t ; thus, gCSSt (St, 0, Bt) is quasi-concave with
respect to Bt. B∗t is the unique unconstrained optimizer of gCSSt (St, 0, Bt), and it is
independent of inventory level St. Bct = min(B
∗
t , qt+1) maximizes g
CSS
t (St, 0, Bt), for
0 ≤ Bt ≤ qt+1.
5. Let us prove the concavity of GRt (St) with respect to St.
We consider G
′′R
t (St) in three cases:




t (St) = J
′′
t+1(St) ≤ 0 due to the concavity of Jt+1.







t+1(St − k)dΦ1,2t (k) + (J ′t+1(R∗t )− p2t − `t − ht)φ1,2t (St −R∗t ) ≤ 0
due to the choice of R∗t and the concavity of Jt+1.









t−) = p2t + `t + ht − J ′t+1(R∗t ) ≤ 0
due to the choice of R∗t and the concavity of Jt+1.
Since G
′′R
t (St) ≤ 0 for all St, GRt (St) is concave in St.
6. Let us prove the concavity of GBt (St) with respect to St, where G
B
t (St) = g
CSS






t (St) =−αt(p2t + `2t − β2t − J ′t+1(−Bt))φ1,2t (St + Bt/αt)
+[αt(p2t + `
1










t+1(αt(St − k))dΦ1,2t (k).
The first term in G
′′B
t (St) is negative due to the choice of B
∗
t . The third and the fourth
terms in G
′′B
t (St) are negative due to the concavity of Jt+1(St). We have G
′′B
t (St) ≤ 0
and therefore, GBt (St, Bt) is concave in St.
7. Let us prove the concavity of Gt(St). In each period, we must be in one of the following
cases, which are independent of the St values:
– If p2t + `
2
t − β2t ≤ J ′t+1(0) ≤ p2t + `t + ht, we have R∗t = B∗t = 0, therefore
Rct = B
c
t = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) = G
R
t (St) = G
B
t (St).
– If J ′t+1(0) > p
2
t + `t + ht, we have R
∗
t ≥ 0 and B∗t = 0, therefore Rct ≥ 0 and
Bct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) = G
R
t (St) ≥ GBt (St).
– If p2t + `
2
t − β2t < J ′t+1(0), we have B∗t ≥ 0 and R∗t = 0, therefore Bct ≥ 0 and
Rct = 0; thus, we have Gt(St) = G
B
t (St) ≥ GRt (St).
We see that in each period, Gt(St) reduces to some function that is proved to be
concave. Therefore Gt(St) is concave.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
Proofs for Infinite Capacity Case
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. (i) In order to find the optimal leadtime, we look at the first order condition. Taking









B −Aeµ` − Ce−µ`
)
= 0,
where A = αµR, B = (α + µ)(c + µR), and C = (α + 2µ)c. By letting x = eµ`, it is easily
seen that this is a quadratic equation. So, the leadtime values that satisfy the first order















(α + µ)(c + µR)±
√




(α + µ)2(c − µR)2 + 4µ3Rc > 0 holds for any positive α, µ, c and R, hence two real roots
exist.
Profit function is given by:
Π(`) = e−α`(R− c
µ
e−µ`)(1− e−µ`).
When ` = 0, the arrival rate (1 − e−µ`)= 0, therefore, we have Π(0) = 0. Since `, α and
µ are greater than zero, the only part of the Π(`) that needs to be considered for positive
profit is the middle part. Below, the requirement (23) gives the conditon on ` that ensures
having positive profit.
Π(`) > 0 ⇔ (R− c
µ













(α + µ)(c + µR) +
√


















Note that, when ` = 0, ∂Π∂` =
B−A−C
µ = µR − c. Therefore, when µR < c, the profit
function Π(`) is decreasing at zero, which ensures the small root `− is the minimizer and
the maximizer is the bigger root `+ due to the fact that Π(`+) > 0. When µR ≥ c, we will
show that the small root `− is smaller than or equal to zero, therefore we have only one
positive root `+ and it is the maximizer. For this result, we need to show that x− ≤ 1.
Observe that
√
(α + µ)2(c− µR)2 + 4µ3Rc >
√
µ2(c + µR)2 by omitting the positive
term (α2 + 2αµ)(c− µR)2 from the left hand side. Therefore;
x− =
(α + µ)(c + µR)−
√
(α + µ)2(c− µR)2 + 4µ3Rc
2αRµ
<








This concludes the proof of `+ being the maximizer of (11).





`∗ = 1µ ln(θ) is increasing in µ, and since R =
cn
µ , `
∗ is decreasing in R. Since limR→∞ θ =
α+µ
α > 1, `
∗ is always positive.






(α + µ)(c + µR) +
√








(α + µ)(c + µR) +
√












Proofs for Finite Capacity Case
The following three lemmas are used for the proofs of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3.
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Lemma C.1. Let Ecost(i) = c · i + Eclearing(i), for i = 0, 1, ..., where,
Eclearing(i) =
Pr{X(`) = 0} · c · i + ∑ij=1 Pr{X(`) = j}[(i− j) · c + Eclearing(i− j)]
1− Pr{X(`) = 0} .
Then, Eclearing(i) and Ecost(i) are increasing and convex in i.
Proof. Proof will be done by induction on i for Eclearing(i) and this will imply that Ecost(i)
is also increasing and convex in i since c · i is convex and increasing in i. Let ∆Eclearing(i) =
Eclearing(i+1)−Eclearing(i). For the initial step, Eclearing(1) = c·Pr{X(`)=0}1−Pr{X(`)=0} > Eclearing(0) =
0, and ∆Eclearing(1) > ∆Eclearing(0) which is given by;
c · Pr{X(`) = 0}+ Pr{X(`) = 1}[c + Eclearing(1)]
1− Pr{X(`) = 0} >
c · Pr{X(`) = 0}
1− Pr{X(`) = 0} .
Assume Eclearing(i) is increasing and convex in i for i = 1, . . . , (n − 1). Given the general
term for ∆Eclearing(i) below,
Pr{X(`) = 0} · c + ∑ij=1 Pr{X(`) = j}[c + Eclearing(i + 1− j)−Eclearing(i− j)]
1− Pr{X(`) = 0} ,
it is easily seen that Eclearing(n) > Eclearing(n − 1) and ∆Eclearing(n) > ∆Eclearing(n − 1)
due to the induction hypothesis.
Lemma C.2 (from [76]). Let φ(i) = g(f(i)), i = 0, 1, ..., where f(i) is a convex, non-
decreasing, integer-valued function of i = 0, 1, ..., with f(0) ≥ 0, and g(j) is a concave,
non-increasing function of j = 0, 1, ... . Then φ(i) is a concave non-increasing function of
i = 0, 1, . . .
Lemma C.3 (from [76]). Let gk(i) = maxa=0,1,...,k{ar + f(i + a)}, i = 0, 1, ... . If f(.) is
concave and non-increasing, then gk(.) is concave and non-increasing in i.
These three lemmas are used for the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Lemma C.4 (from [81]). The collection of distribution functions Fs(k) is stochastically
increasing in s on S, if and only if
∫
h(k)dFs(k) is increasing in s on S for each increasing
real-valued function h(k).
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Lemma C.5. Given {Fs(k) : s ∈ S} is a collection of stochastically increasing distribution
functions in s, and v(i, k, s) is a real-valued function that is non-decreasing in s for i and
some fixed k, and also non-decreasing in k for i and some fixed s then;
V (i, s) =
∫
v(i, k, s)dFs(k) is non-decreasing in s.
Proof. We have,
V (i, s + 1) =
∫
v(i, k, s + 1)dFs+1(k)≥
∫
v(i, k, s)dFs+1(k)
≥ ∫ v(i, k, s)dFs(k) = V (i, s)
The first inequality follows from v(i, k, s) being non-decreasing in s, and the second in-
equality follows from Lemma C.4 since v(i, k, s) is non-decreasing in k and Fs(k) is stochas-
tically increasing in s.
Lemma C.6. Let vn−1(i, k, s) = maxa=0,...,k{a ·R + Un−1(i + a, s)}. Assuming Un−1(i, s +
1)− Un−1(i, s) ≥ 0, vn−1(i, k, s) is non-decreasing in k and s.
Proof. Un−1(i, s + 1) ≥ Un−1(i, s) ⇒ a · R + Un−1(i + a, s + 1) ≥ a · R + Un−1(i + a, s)
for every a. Then the maximization for s + 1 is applied over a set whose elements have a
higher value than that of s, which implies vn−1(i, k, s) is non-decreasing in s. Obviously,
vn−1(i, k, s) is also non-decreasing in k, since the feasible set gets larger as k increases.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. The proof will be done by induction on n. The case n = 1 is immediate, since
V0(i) = −Ecost(i) is concave and non-increasing in i by Lemma C.1. Taking expectations
and using Lemma C.2, U1(i) is concave and non-increasing in i, since (i−X(`))+ is convex
and non-decreasing in i, for each fixed value of X(`). Then using lemma C.3 and taking
expectations, we get V1(i) as concave and non-increasing in i.
Now, suppose n ≥ 2 and Vn−1(i) is concave and non-increasing in i.
Since (i − X(`))+ is convex and non-decreasing in i, for each fixed value of X(`), it
follows from the induction hypothesis, using Lemma C.2 and taking expectations that Un(i)
is concave and non-increasing in i. So, again by using Lemma C.3 and taking expectations,
we get Vn(i) as concave and non-increasing in i, which concludes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. First, we show that the optimal acceptance policy is a threshold policy in i for a
fixed service index s, and in the second part, we prove that the optimal decision levels are
convex in s for a fixed i, for any period n.
1. Let us start by showing that the optimal acceptance policy is a threshold policy in i
for a fixed service index s. We first need to prove the following lemma:
Lemma C.7. Let g(i, s) = E
{
f(0, s+)I{X(`) ≥ i}+f((i−X(`))+, s−)I{X(`) < i}
}
,
i = 0, 1, ..., where f(i, s) is concave and non-increasing in i for a fixed s. Then, g(i, s)
is concave and non-increasing in i, i = 0, 1, ..., for a fixed s.
Proof. g(i, s) = f(0, s+)
∑∞
j=i Pr{X(`) = j}+
∑i−1
j=0 f(i− j, s−)Pr{X(`) = j}
If we define ∆g(i, s) = g(i, s)− g(i + 1, s) and ∆f(i, s−) = f(i, s−)− f(i + 1, s−), we
have;
∆g(i, s) = (f(0, s+)− f(1, s−))Pr{X(`) = i}+ ∑i−1j=0 ∆f(i− j, s−)Pr{X(`) = j}.
For concavity, we need ∆g(i, s) ≤ ∆g(i + 1, s) for every i = 0, 1, ....
∆g(i + 1, s) = (f(0, s+)− f(1, s−))Pr{X(`) = i + 1}
+
∑i
j=0 ∆f(i + 1− j, s−)Pr{X(`) = j}
≥ (f(0, s+)− f(1, s−))Pr{X(`) = i + 1}
+
∑i−1
j=0 ∆f(i + 1− j, s−)Pr{X(`) = j}
≥ (f(0, s+)− f(1, s−))Pr{X(`) = i}+ ∑i−1j=0 ∆f(i− j, s−)Pr{X(`) = j}
= ∆g(i, s)
First inequality is due to non-increasingness of f(i, s) for a fixed s. Second inequality
comes from two properties. First one is the concavity of the f(i, s), which ensures
∆f(i + 1− j, s−) ≥ ∆f(i− j, s−). Second one is due to the batch processing assump-
tion, which ensures Pr{X(`) = i} = Pr{X(`) = i + 1} where i ≤ M − 1 due to
assumption of not accepting more than M customers to the system.
Showing that the optimal acceptance policy is a threshold policy in i for a fixed service
index s is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. The only difference is instead of
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Lemma C.2, Lemma C.7 is used when the service index is fixed.
2. The proof is done by mathematical induction on n. Let hn(i, s) = Un(i, s+1)−Un(i, s).
We show that:
– hn(i, s) ≥ 0, ∀ i, s (?),
– hn(i, 0) is decreasing and hn(i, 1) is increasing in i (??),
holds for any period n, which implies that the optimal decision levels are convex in s
for any period n. First we start by proving a result that shows how the structure of
hn(i, 0) and hn(i, 1) determines the form of the acceptance policy, and then proceed
with the proof.
Lemma C.8. Given that hn(i, 0) is decreasing in i, and hn(i, 1) is increasing in i, the
optimal decisions in period n have the property of being convex in s; a∗s=0(i) ≥ a∗s=1(i)
and a∗s=1(i) ≤ a∗s=2(i).
Proof. Let us start with hn(i, 0).
hn(i, 0) = Un(i, 1)− Un(i, 0)≥Un(i + 1, 1)− Un(i + 1, 0) = hn(i + 1, 0) ∀i
Un(i, 1)− Un(i + 1, 1)≥Un(i, 0)− Un(i + 1, 0) ∀i (24)
We know from the first part of this theorem that Un(i, ·) is concave and non-increasing
in i. Then the optimal acceptance decision for a service level s is decided by the
intersection of R and the Un(i, s) − Un(i + 1, s) curve. Inequality 24 shows that
a∗s=0(i) ≥ a∗s=1(i), since Un(i, 1)−Un(i+1, 1) intersects R first. The proof of the case
for a∗s=1(i) ≤ a∗s=2(i) is very similar to the first case.





[Vn−1(0, 2)− Vn−1(0, 1)]Pr{X(`) ≥ i} if s = 0
∑i−1
j=0(Vn−1(i− j, 1)− Vn−1(i− j, 0))Pr{X(`) = j} if s = 1
We have V0(i, s + 1)− V0(i, s) = Slast by assumption. So h1(i, s) ≥ 0 ∀ i, s for period
1. Also, it is easily seen that h1(i, 0) is decreasing in i, and h1(i, 1) is increasing in i.
By Lemma C.8, a∗s=0(i) ≥ a∗s=1(i) and a∗s=1(i) ≤ a∗s=2(i) for period 1.
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Assume (?) and (??) hold for period (n− 1).
By Lemma C.6, vn−1(i, k, s) = maxa=0,...,k{a ·R+Un−1(i+a, s)} is non-decreasing in
k and s. Then, by Lemma C.5, Vn−1(i, s) is non-decreasing in s. So for period n, since
Vn−1(i, s+1) ≥ Vn−1(i, s), it is easily seen that hn(i, s) = Un(i, s+1)−Un(i, s) ≥ 0 (?)
and hn(i, 0) = Un(i, 1) − Un(i, 0) is decreasing in i. To see that hn(i, 1) is increasing
in i, let us look at hn(0, 1) for the sequence of i’s:
hn(0, 1) = 0
hn(1, 1) = [Vn−1(1, 1)− Vn−1(1, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 0}
hn(2, 1) = [Vn−1(2, 1)− Vn−1(2, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 0}
+[Vn−1(1, 1)− Vn−1(1, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 1}
hn(3, 1) = [Vn−1(3, 1)− Vn−1(3, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 0}
+[Vn−1(2, 1)− Vn−1(2, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 1}
+[Vn−1(1, 1)− Vn−1(1, 0)]Pr{X(`) = 2}
...
hn(i, 1) is increasing in i, since Pr{X(`) = i − 1} = Pr{X(`) = i}. Using Lemma
C.8, we conclude that a∗s=0(i) ≥ a∗s=1(i) and a∗s=1(i) ≤ a∗s=2(i) for period n.
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APPENDIX D
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. Assume that there exists a function satisfying the conditions in the theorem. We
will show that V is equal to Ṽ . Let us use the same kind of martingales as in expressions
(14) and (15) for V (t, n(t)). For s ≥ t, let:




GV (u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+)du.
m(s) is a martingale by Dynkin’s Lemma and since the expected value of this martingale
at any time s is equal to its expected value at the starting time t, we have Em(s) = 0.
Further, by the optional sampling theorem, for any stopping time τ ≥ t we have:
E
[




GV (u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+)du = V (t, n(t))(25)
E
[






[G(V + Π)(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du
= V (t, n(t))−E
∫ τ
t
[GΠ(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du.
If we subtract E
∫ τ
t
[GΠ(u, [n(t) − NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du from
both sides of (25), the left-hand side of the resulting term, given by (26), is always positive
by conditions (i), (iii) and (iv). Therefore,
V (t, n(t)) ≥ E
∫ τ
t
[GΠ(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du.
Since V (t, n(t)) is greater than or equal to each term in the right-hand side of equation (19)
for any τ , it is also greater than or equal to the supremum over all τ , which is Ṽ (t, n(t)) in
equation (19). Hence, we conclude that V (t, n(t)) ≥ Ṽ (t, n(t)) for any stopping time τ ≥ t.
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To prove that V (t, n(t)) ≤ Ṽ (t, n(t)), we will define a specific stopping time. Let σ
be defined as σ = inf
{
t ≤ s ≤ T : V (s, [n(t) − NB(s) + NB(t)]+) = 0
}
. Note that σ is
well-defined because V (T, ·) = 0. Replacing τ in equation (26) with the specific stopping
time σ, we obtain:
E
[






[G(V + Π)(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du
= V (t, n(t))− E
∫ σ
t
[GΠ(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du.
The definition of σ implies V (σ, [n(t)−NB(σ) + NB(t)]+) = 0, and the definition of σ and
condition (iv) together imply that G(Π)(u, [n(t) − NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB = 0 for all
u ∈ [t, σ]. Therefore the left-hand side of (27) is zero and we have:
V (t, n(t)) = E
∫ σ
t
[GΠ(u, [n(t)−NB(u) + NB(t)]+) + λBpB1{NB(u)−NB(t))<n(t)}
]
du
≤ Ṽ (t, n(t)).
The inequality follows from the fact that the left-hand side of the inequality is the right-
hand side of equation (19) for a specific stopping time, and Ṽ (t, n(t)) is the supremum over
all stopping times τ in that equation. Hence, V (t, n(t)) = Ṽ (t, n(t)).
Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof. Using the definition of derivative, conditioning on Ni(T ) − Ni(t + h) and omitting
the zero terms, we get:









λihP (Ni(T )−Ni(t) = k − 1)
h




k=1 P [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≥ k]
∂t
= −λiP [Ni(T )−Ni(t) ≤ n(t)− 1]. Using
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this equality we have:
GΠ(t, n(t)) = ∂Π(t, n(t))
∂t
+ λB[Π(t, n(t)− 1)−Π(t, n(t))]
=−λ1p1P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≤ n(t)− 1]− λ2p2P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≤ n(t)− 1]
−λBp1P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]− λBp2P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ n(t)]
=−λ1p1
(
1− P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]
)− λ2p2
(
1− P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ n(t)]
)
−λBp1P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]− λBp2P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ n(t)]
=−λ1p1 − λ2p2 + p1(λ1 − λB)P [N1(T )−N1(t) ≥ n(t)]
+ p2(λ2 − λB)P [N2(T )−N2(t) ≥ n(t)].
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. The proof will be done by mathematical induction on n(t). When n(t) = 1,
V (t, n(t) − 1) = 0, and we have L(t, 1) = GΠ(t, 1) + λBpB, which is an increasing func-
tion in t since GΠ(t, 1) is an increasing function in t. We claim that for t ≤ x1:
L(t, 1) = GΠ(t, 1) + λBpB ≤ GΠ(x1, 1) + λBpB ≤ 0.
The first inequality is by the increasing property of GΠ(t, 1) in t. The second inequality
follows from the fact that if GΠ(x1, 1)+λBpB > 0 then
∫ T
x1
L(s, n(t))e−λB(s−t)ds > 0, which
contradicts the definition of x1. Hence for t ≤ x1 (or V (t, 1) = 0 by the definition of V ):
G(V + Π)(t, 1) + λBpB = ∂V (t, 1)
∂t
+ λB[V (t, 0)− V (t, 1)] + GΠ(t, 1) + λBpB
= GΠ(t, 1) + λBpB = L(t, 1) ≤ 0.
Thus, condition (iii) is satisfied when n(t) = 1 and t ≤ x1 (or V (t, 1) = 0).
When t > x1 (or V (t, 1) > 0):
G(V + Π)(t, 1) + λBpB = ∂V (t, 1)
∂t




− λBV (t, 1) + GΠ(t, 1) + λBpB. (30)
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By the definition of V (t, n(t)), we have V (t, 1) =
∫ T
t
L(s, 1)e−λB(s−t)ds. Taking the deriva-






λBL(s, 1)e−λB(s−t)ds− L(t, 1) = λBV (t, 1)− GΠ(t, 1)− λBpB. (31)
Substituting (31) into (30), we get G(V + Π)(t, 1) + λBpB = 0. V (t, 1) > 0. Therefore
condition (iv) is satisfied when n(t) = 1. Moreover, we have V (t, 1) ≥ V (t, 0) = 0 by the
definition of x1 (∃ t: V (t, 1) > 0 if x1 > 0).
Now assume that the following statements hold for n(t) ≤ k < M : there exist k time
thresholds with T ≥ x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xk ≥ 0 such that V (t, n(t)) is derived from equation
(22) and satisfies conditions (i)-(iv), and the inequality V (t, n(t)) ≥ V (t, n(t)− 1) holds for
n(t) = 1 . . . k.
For n(t) = k + 1,
L(t, k + 1) = GΠ(t, k + 1) + λBpB + λBV (t, k) ≥ GΠ(t, k) + λBpB + λBV (t, k − 1) = L(t, k),
since GΠ(t, k) and V (t, k) are increasing in k by the induction assumption. This implies:
∫ T
t




Together with equation (22), this implies V (t, k + 1) ≥ V (t, k) and xk ≥ xk+1.
For t ≤ xk+1 (or V (t, k + 1) = 0),
G(V + Π)(t, k + 1) + λBpB = ∂V (t, k + 1)
∂t
+ λB[V (t, k)− V (t, k + 1)] + GΠ(t, k + 1) + λBpB
= GΠ(t, k + 1) + λBpB + λBV (t, k) = L(t, k + 1)
≤L(xk+1, k + 1) ≤ 0.
Note that V (t, k) = V (t, k + 1) = 0 since t ≤ xk+1 ≤ xk. The first inequality follows from
GΠ(t, k + 1) being increasing in t, and the second inequality follows from the fact that if
L(xk+1, k +1) > 0 then this will contradict the definition of xk+1. Therefore, condition (iii)
is satisfied, when t ≤ xk+1 (or V (t, k + 1) = 0).
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For t > xk+1 (or V (t, k + 1) > 0),
G(V + Π)(t, k + 1) + λBpB
=
∂V (t, k + 1)
∂t
+ λB[V (t, k)− V (t, k + 1)] + GΠ(t, k + 1) + λBpB
=−L(t, k + 1) + λBV (t, k + 1) + λB[V (t, k)− V (t, k + 1)] + GΠ(t, k + 1) + λBpB = 0.
Therefore condition (iv) is satisfied when t > xk+1 (or V (t, k + 1) = 0).
For n(t) = k+1 we showed that conditions (i)-(iv) hold. Thus V (t, k) that is determined
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